Under a cooperative agreement with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Democracy International organized an international election observation mission for the 2009 elections in Afghanistan. The purpose of DI’s mission was to observe and report on the electoral process—including pre-election preparations, election day, and the post-election process—and, to the extent possible, to evaluate the degree to which the elections conformed to international standards. In so doing, the mission would help promote good governance by strengthening democratic election systems and processes. The project complemented ongoing efforts supported by the U.S. government and others to help build a more participatory, representative, and accountable democracy in Afghanistan.
This is a revised copy of the report, released in August 2010.
This report is based on information gathered through the ongoing work of Democracy International (DI) in support of Afghanistan’s democratic transition. It relies heavily on the findings of DI’s election observation delegation to the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections. It is also informed by DI’s ongoing effort to support election reform in Afghanistan. Although we believe this report reflects the collective views of our observer delegation, DI takes full responsibility for its content.
Each member of Democracy International’s delegation made a critical contribution to the mission, and we would like to express our sincere appreciation for their work. Delegates contributed generously of their time and participated at considerable personal risk, and they should be recognized for their commitment to democratic development in Afghanistan. We are forever grateful to former Congressman Jim Moody for his ongoing commitment to democratic development in South Asia and for once again serving as our delegation leader, as he did previously in Pakistan. Biographical sketches of the members of the delegation are included in Appendix D.
We deeply appreciate the outstanding efforts of our team of core staff members and long-term observers. David Avery served as Country Director and managed the implementation of DI’s long-term and short-term observation, including preparations for the presidential runoff election. Whitney Haring-Smith coordinated logistics and election-day planning and provided analysis of election results and electoral issues throughout the audit process. Bill Gallery coordinated the project’s finances, provided operational support in Kabul, offered technical assistance on election monitoring methodology, and provided critical analysis of election issues. Belquis Ahmedi supervised the efforts of DI’s long-term observers. Jeremy Wagstaff coordinated media relations, including innovative attention to new media, with assistance from Evan Smith, Sari Sudarsono, and Leslie Knot. Brian Katulis served as mission spokesperson.
DI greatly appreciates the efforts of its long-term observers: David Aasen, Marie Allegret, Tim Fairbank, Chris Jackson, Hursh Joshi, Laurie Knop, Alexis Michel, Greg Minjack, Jennifer McCarthy, Adam Sugar, and Ines Thevarajah. They conducted interviews and collected information from around Afghanistan over a number of weeks. Laurie Knop deserves special recognition for tackling a wide range of additional responsibilities with sound judgment and good spirit. Dr. Najib Barakzai and Bihshta Rahi ensured DI’s Kabul office ran efficiently. Javid Jalali provided interpretation and translation for the Kabul office. Abdullah Ahmadzai was an invaluable asset providing high quality and reliable logistics services.
Scott Carnie, as DI Security Director, was responsible for the safety and security of each member of the delegation, a role he performed admirably. Dave Cowey was an invaluable resource for observers on security issues and much more. DI is grateful to the Olive Group for providing personal security details and general security support, and we thank Martin Callan, Kev Ellis, John Campbell, and Mick Brown for their efforts.
DI’s home office-based staff supported the mission throughout the life of the project. Bill Gallery and Lawrence Lachmansingh coordinated all aspects of the project from Bethesda. Miki Wilkins led DI’s recruitment efforts, oversaw deployment logistics, and served as the primary observer liaison. Jed Ober and Will Covey provided operational, technical, and logistical support in Bethesda and Kabul. Evan Smith led communications efforts from Bethesda and contributed to media relations in Kabul. Bindi Jhaveri coordinated travel. Danielle Pearl supported observer deployment in Bethesda and Kabul. Each of them traveled to Afghanistan to support the project and participate in the mission.
We are grateful as well to Eileen Anderson and Debra Stuckey who patiently sorted out the project’s complex accounting challenges. Emily Siedlak provided support to project accounting, operations, and logistics.
Many people contributed to this report. David Avery and Belquis Ahmedi initiated the drafting process, and each long-term observer contributed. Laurie Knop took on considerable responsibility for drafting and quality control. DI staff members Jed Ober, Bill Gallery, and Will Covey helped write and contributed substantively to the report, and Tim Duvall and Jon Gatto provided editing assistance. Eric Bjornlund also edited the entire document.
We would also like to thank the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan for facilitating observer accreditation and for their cooperation throughout the election process. Grant Kippen and Peter Lepsch of the Electoral Complaints Commission were constantly available to DI observers. Margie Cooke and Barbara Smith of UNDP-Elect provided invaluable access and information. We are grateful to Nader Nadery and Jandad Spingar of the Free and Fair Elections Foundation of Afghanistan, Hannah Roberts and her colleagues from the OSCE Election Support Team, Paul Rowland and members of NDI’s election observation mission, representatives of the European Union’s Election Observation Mission, and countless other observers.
Finally, we would like to thank the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department, including the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan, for the support they have provided and the confidence they have shown in Democracy International. We would particularly like to thank Ben Garrett, Susan Stamper, and Goranka Henegar for their guidance and Niaz Gul Afghanyar for his logistical support. We are also indebted to Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Ambassador Tim Carney, and other officials at the U.S. embassy for their support.
Democracy International is grateful to have had the opportunity to organize this important election observation mission and for the continuing opportunity to support democratic development in Afghanistan.
Glenn Cowan and Eric Bjornlund
ACSF Afghan Civil Society Forum
AIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
ANA Afghanistan National Army
ANP Afghanistan National Police
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces
ANPO Afghan National Participation Organization
AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
AWEC Afghan Women’s Educational Center
CCA Cooperation Center for Afghanistan
CSHRN Civil Society & Human Rights Network
CSO Civil Society Organization
DFC District Field Coordinator
DI Democracy International
DIAG Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
ECC Electoral Complaints Commission
EOM Election Observation Mission
EU European Union
FEFA Free and Fair Elections Foundation of Afghanistan
GoA Government of Afghanistan
IDLG Independent Directorate for Local Government
IEC Independent Election Commission
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
IRI International Republican Institute
JEMB Joint Electoral Management Body
LTO Long-Term Observer
MOE Margin of Error
MC Media Commission
MJ Meshrano Jirga
MoD Ministry of Defence
MoI Ministry of Interior
MoWA Ministry of Women’s Affairs
NAWA New Afghanistan Women’s Association
NDI National Democratic Institute
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NSD National Security Directorate
NSP National Solidarity Program
PC Provincial Council
PC Polling Center
PCM Polling Center Manager
PECC Provincial Electoral Complaints Commission
P-IEC Provincial Independent Election Commission
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
PS Polling Station
RPCF Regulation on Political Campaign Finance
RTA Radio Television Afghanistan
SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SNTV Single Non-Transferable Vote
STO Short-Term Observer
TAF The Asia Foundation
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNDP-Elect UNDP Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WJ Wolesi Jirga
On August 20, 2009, Afghanistan held critical presidential and provincial council elections. Although these were not the first competitive elections held in Afghanistan, they were the first elections run by an Afghan election commission since the fall of the Taliban. The elections were a major test of the country’s prospects for democracy and political stability.
Despite the threat of serious, widespread violence, millions of Afghans turned out to vote in the elections, and initially it appeared they had engaged in a reasonable democratic process, given the conflict that afflicted the country. As the process continued after election day, however, it became apparent that fraud had been widespread. A controversial method for determining the final results further undermined the integrity of the election. Ultimately, the process set back the near-term prospects for a democratic Afghanistan.
Under a cooperative agreement with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Democracy International organized an international election observation mission for the 2009 elections in Afghanistan. The purpose of DI’s mission was to observe and report on the electoral process—including pre-election preparations, election day, and the post-election process—and, to the extent possible, to evaluate the degree to which the elections conformed to international standards. In so doing, the mission would help promote good governance by strengthening democratic election systems and processes. The project complemented ongoing efforts supported by the U.S. government and others to help build a more participatory, representative, and accountable democracy in Afghanistan.
The DI observation mission deployed a team of 62 long- and short-term observers, including noted experts in election administration, election monitoring, and Afghan politics. DI deployed its core team and long-term observers (LTOs) to Kabul in late July. LTOs were joined by short-term observers (STOs) for the week around election day. On election day, the observers visited 13 provinces. DI also conducted a postelection assessment of the impact of the elections on the political climate in Afghanistan and has closely monitored postelection developments.
The newly created Independent Election Commission (IEC) was responsible for administering and supervising election activities in Afghanistan, including voter and candidate registration, the campaign and voting processes, and certification of election results. The UN supervised the administration of elections in 2004 and 2005, but the IEC organized the 2009 elections largely on its own, with the UN assisting in a support role.
There were several issues during the voter registration process including: underage registration, more than one registration per individual voter, lack of impartiality of electoral staff, registration of women based on lists provided by male relatives, inaccessibility of voter registration centers, and lack of a voter list.
The number of women registered for the 2009 elections was lower than for the 2004 elections. Nevertheless, there were implausibly high levels of female registration in some of the more insecure, traditionally conservative, provinces. There is reason to believe that this enabled “proxy voting” (men in traditional communities registering and voting on behalf of women in their families) and may have facilitated fraud in these regions.
Security was a serious cause for concern for women candidates. Poor security and the placement of polling stations in places that were not culturally appropriate for some women, such as government buildings, also disproportionately affected the ability of women to cast ballots. Women’s participation in Afghan politics and elections will continue to be a determinant of the ultimate success of the consolidation of democracy in Afghanistan.
Antigovernment elements pursued an aggressive campaign of threats and intimidation in the run-up to election day. At times it looked as if the escalating violence might prevent the elections from taking place altogether. This ongoing threat of violence had a significant impact on both accessibility and participation. Even in locations where security forces were successful in temporarily dislodging antigovernment elements, a significant portion of the population was still dissuaded from taking part in the process. A number of polling centers did not open due to security concerns.
Democracy International observers reported that election officials were generally well prepared and polling stations were equipped with transparent ballot boxes, ballot papers, indelible ink, and other essential materials. Despite confusion surrounding an election-day order extending the time for polling, the counting process as we observed it generally proceeded smoothly on election day and the day following. DI observers did report the likelihood of stuffed ballot boxes in the south, particularly in Kandahar.
DI observers provided mixed reports on voter turnout. Most DI observers supported the belief shared by election officials, UNAMA, and other observer groups that turnout was significantly lower than expected.
Unfortunately, in the weeks following the election it seemed that, rather than releasing results as they became available and fully explaining its processes, the IEC was managing the announcement of results. Preliminary results were tallied and released at a languid pace. The delays raised suspicions that the government was improperly interfering in the process of announcing the results.
The apparent managed release of results likely contributed to perceptions of fraud in the first-round election. Areas in which Hamid Karzai was likely to perform well were not reported until late in the results-reporting process, and thus many in the international media and the opposing campaigns perceived the large increase in Karzai’s vote share in the last few days of results reporting as illegitimate. The lack of transparency in the results reporting process compounded perceptions of fraud.
Mounting concerns about electoral fraud prompted the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) to order the IEC on September 8 to conduct an “audit and recount” of ballot boxes in the presidential election in polling stations nationwide for which the preliminary results met certain criteria that suggested the possibility of fraud. The intent of the ECC to investigate potential fraud in a systematic manner should be applauded. But the ensuing audit process was flawed. Throughout the process, the IEC and ECC issued multiple methodological and mathematical corrections. More important, no plan was developed for interpretation of the audit results, and the sampling procedure and statistical analysis suffered from significant methodological flaws.
Democracy International calculated that the total number of votes invalidated by the audit process was approximately 1.26 million votes, about 1 million of which were cast for Hamid Karzai. Under Afghanistan’s electoral law, these decisions were binding. On October 19, DI issued a public statement explaining the significance of the ECC’s decisions. As the DI press release explained, after applying the ECC’s decisions to the preliminary results, Hamid Karzai’s percentage of the vote fell below the 50 percent threshold needed to avoid a second-round runoff election. As a result, a runoff between Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah was necessary under the law.
Overall, the ECC process, including the audit, began as a challenging procedural, investigative, and legal endeavor. The Commission then compounded those difficulties by failing to clearly explain its work to the Afghan public.
Official campaigning for the runoff began on October 24 and was scheduled to end on November 5. At the outset of the runoff process, Abdullah’s campaign issued 17 written demands it considered necessary to ensure that the second round of voting would be conducted fairly. Abdullah issued an ultimatum that his demands for personnel changes be met by October 31 or he would withdraw from the race. On November 1, after none of the major personnel changes that he had called for had been made, Abdullah announced that he “would not participate” in the runoff election. After Abdullah’s withdrawal from the race, the IEC declared the runoff election cancelled and Hamid Karzai elected as president of Afghanistan. Although the practical value of holding the runoff election with only one candidate participating would have been questionable, the Afghan constitution and the electoral law were ambiguous about whether the IEC had the authority to cancel the runoff.
Afghanistan’s 2009 elections revealed numerous flaws both in the country’s election system and in the administrative processes that support it. Based on its extensive observation of the election process, and as articulated in the findings and analysis of this report, DI urges the government of Afghanistan and the international community to consider the following recommendations in order to strengthen elections scheduled for 2010 and to reform Afghanistan’s electoral system and improve long-term assistance for Afghan elections.
Strengthening elections held for 2010:
Reforming Afghanistan’s Electoral System and Improving Long-Term Assistance for Afghan Elections:
The deficiencies in the Afghan political system transcend elections and include a number of institutional problems that impede democratic development in the country. Persistent issues include a fragile security environment, obstacles to women’s participation in the political process, executive influence on the judiciary and other institutions, a flawed voter registration system, and an underdeveloped political party system that leads to the election of candidates who do not truly represent their constituents. Until these and other issues are resolved, Afghanistan cannot develop into a genuinely democratic state.
Fairer elections can help to alleviate these problems. But without further electoral and institutional reforms, Afghanistan will continue to face challenges in building a political system that is rooted in democracy and a government that is accountable to and can effectively provide for its people.
On August 20, 2009, Afghanistan held critical presidential and provincial council elections. Although these were not the first competitive elections held in Afghanistan, they were the first elections run by an Afghan election commission since the fall of the Taliban. The elections were a major test of the country’s prospects for democracy and political stability.
The declining security situation throughout the country, combined with widespread corruption and poor service delivery, led many to question the legitimacy of President Hamid Karzai’s government. Faced with a growing insurgency, the international community promoted the elections as a key step in legitimizing the office of the president and establishing the Afghan government as a credible partner to ongoing international efforts in the country.
To this end, the international community provided substantial support to the election process, primarily through the UNDP-Elect project, which provided direct assistance to the election commission and other stakeholders. Additional projects complemented these efforts, and international security forces provided crucial logistical support, such as transporting election materials to remote areas.
Given the international political context, these elections—in particular the presidential contest—were seen widely as crucial for the future of Afghanistan and were closely watched by the media and the broader international community.
Under a cooperative agreement with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Democracy International organized an international election observation mission for the August elections in Afghanistan. The purpose of DI’s mission was to observe and report on the electoral process and, to the extent possible, evaluate the degree to which the elections conformed to international standards. In so doing, the mission would help promote good governance by strengthening democratic election systems and processes. The project complemented ongoing efforts supported by the U.S. government and others to help build a more participatory, representative, and accountable democracy in Afghanistan.
International observers had great potential to contribute to the integrity of the electoral process in Afghanistan. As DI principals have written, “In fragile states the international community has a far greater role in determining the legitimacy of elections than it does in more stable transitional or established democracies.”[1]Because these were the first Afghan-led democratic elections since the fall of the Taliban, and because the risk of controversy about election results was high, international election monitoring had the potential to make a significant contribution to stability and future democratization.
DI signed a cooperative agreement with USAID to conduct this program in early July and immediately began deploying staff members to Kabul to make logistical preparations for the mission. Long-term observers (LTOs) began arriving in Kabul in late July and were joined by short-term observers (STOs) for the week around election day. In total, DI recruited and deployed 62 experts and staff members to observe the August 20 elections. Members of that group included noted experts in election administration, election monitoring, and Afghan politics.
Following the declaration of a runoff election on November 7 between the top two presidential candidates, DI received additional funding from USAID to observe the runoff. DI recruited a 22-member delegation and had begun deploying observers to Kabul when the election was cancelled on November 2.
This report presents DI’s findings and provides recommendations for improving the electoral process in Afghanistan before the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2010. Following a description of DI’s observation methodology, the report outlines the historical background, political context for these elections, and the pre-election context leading up to election day on August 20. The report then presents the election results and the delegation’s observations from election day and the postelection period, including DI’s preparations for the aborted presidential runoff. Finally, the report offers recommendations for electoral and political reform.
The information in this report comes from a variety of sources, primarily the findings of DI’s pre-election, election day, postelection, and continuing observation missions. DI relied heavily on the extensive expertise and knowledge of its staff and delegates. DI’s mission drew on credible local sources of information, including political leaders, candidates, governmental officials, local and international civil society organizations, local election monitoring groups, nonpartisan election monitors, and journalists at both national and provincial levels.
Experience throughout the world over the past two decades has shown that international election observers can have a positive impact on a country’s successful transition to democracy. By increasing transparency, election observation helps deter fraud and reduce irregularities in election administration, especially in transitional environments such as Afghanistan with the potential for instability and violence. Properly conceived and implemented, comprehensive international election observation not only provides an objective assessment of a given country’s electoral process but can also promote the integrity of the elections and related institutions, encourage public participation, and reinforce domestic commitment to democratic politics.
In accordance with the international consensus that election monitoring should assess the entire election period and the Declaration of Principles on International Election Observation, of which DI is an endorsing organization, DI’s election monitoring project in Afghanistan had a broad scope. It covered the periods both before and after the vote as well as election day itself. DI’s mission included a team of long-term observers (LTOs) that arrived in Afghanistan four weeks before the August 20 elections to monitor the electoral environment before, during, and after the elections. They met with various international and local actors from the Afghan government, the U.S. government, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), civil society organizations, local election observation groups, and political campaigns. For the elections, the DI observation mission included a team of 62 long- and short-term observers. On election day, the observers visited 13 provinces: Badghis, Farah, Ghazni, Helmand, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangahar, Paktika, Panjshir, Parwan, Kapisa, and Zabul. DI also conducted a postelection assessment of the impact of the elections on the political climate in Afghanistan and has closely monitored postelection developments.
DI’s election observation mission to Afghanistan assessed a broad range of substantive issues, including: (1) the administration of the elections, including the processes of voter registration, balloting, counting, and complaint resolution; (2) the legal and institutional framework for the elections, and the credibility and neutrality of electoral authorities; and (3) the political context and environment in which the elections took place, including the extent of freedoms of speech, movement, and association; the freedom of the media; the opportunities for the opposition to compete; and the nature of the campaign.
DI’s team began its work in mid-July 2009. This included a core team of international staff members and long-term observers supported by Afghan staff members and security personnel. Short-term observers joined the mission several days before election day. DI’s long-term observers deployed to the provinces of Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangahar, Kapisa, Panjshir, and Parwan three weeks before the elections to conduct observations of the pre-election political and electoral environment. The LTO teams gathered valuable information through meetings with government officials, including the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan (IEC), the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), political party agents, and provincial and presidential candidates. They also met with civil society organizations, including domestic monitoring groups and others that provided technical assistance in Afghanistan or observed the elections, such as the European Union Election Observation Mission to Afghanistan, UNDP’s election assistance project (UNDP-Elect), The Asia Foundation (TAF), and IFES.
For the election-day observation phase, the DI delegation convened for two days of briefings in Kabul with candidate representatives, the IEC, the ECC, civil society leaders, UNDP-Elect, political observers, journalists, and others. These briefings covered the political situation in Afghanistan, the relevant electoral laws and procedures, the fairness of the campaign period, the activities of other monitoring organizations, and other information relevant to effective and informed observation of the process. DI also provided training on poll watching techniques and accepted international observation standards.
The two-day meeting gave DI’s core staff an opportunity to brief observers on the deployment plan and methodology for the mission. In addition, the briefings included information and training on security procedures and on acceptable conduct for election observers, including relevant regulations and policies of the Afghan government, the IEC, and the U.S. government. In accordance with international standards, DI instructed its observers to restrict themselves to observing the electoral process and to avoid any action that could be interpreted as interfering in the process.
Following the briefings in Kabul, two-member teams of short-term observers proceeded to each observation location. Some were stationed with DI’s long-term observer teams in the field, while others were stationed with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), secure bases for the coordination of military operations and development assistance, with the support of ISAF. The regional teams arrived in their cities two days before the elections to meet with candidates, local and regional political party representatives, election administration officials, and representatives of other domestic and international monitoring groups to collect information on the local context and security situation.
On election day, DI’s observers visited 258 polling stations nationwide. The stations were chosen from selected provinces across the country in consultation with Afghan facilitators and security personnel and with other international observer groups. The day after election day, DI observers returned where possible to polling centers to witness the counting of provincial council ballots. The delegates then returned to Kabul for debriefing, discussion of observations and findings, and preparation of a preliminary observation statement. DI issued a press release on August 22, two days after election day, stating that it was “too early to judge” whether the election was credible. (See Appendix A.) DI’s core staff and a small election monitoring team remained in Afghanistan throughout the postelection period to observe the results tabulation, investigation, and audit process.
DI organized and was prepared to deploy approximately 20 international observers for the planned presidential runoff election including two PRTs in Zabul and Helmand and to the cities of Jalalabad, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif. Shortly after Abdullah Abdullah suspended his campaign and the IEC’s subsequent cancellation of the runoff election, DI aborted its observation of the runoff process.
Following the fall of the Taliban in November 2001, a December conference in Bonn, Germany, held under the auspices of the United Nations, established a process for the political reconstruction of Afghanistan. The Bonn Agreement called for a number of elections to help establish a “broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government” that was “not intended to remain in place beyond the specified period of time” of about three years. This process ultimately resulted in the adoption of a new constitution and presidential and provincial council elections in 2004.
The events leading up to the 2004 election help explain the evolution of democracy in Afghanistan and the context for the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections. Many believe that the transition to democracy in Afghanistan began with Hamid Karzai’s election as president in 2004. But by the time the Shah monarchy was abolished in 1973, Afghanistan had held 13 nationwide elections for some form of national legislative assembly.
There has been a long tradition of leadership by consensus in Afghanistan. Throughout the country’s political history, assemblies of leaders, or jirgas, have played a central role in establishing authority and enabling pluralistic decision-making and have served as a ratification mechanism from the most local tribal gatherings to national legislative assemblies. These jirgas have always been characterized by an “underlying ethic … of equality, every adult male having the right to participate . . . [and] contribute to its decisions.”[2]An early example of this pluralistic tradition took place when a loya jirga elected Ahmed Shah Durrani, the founder of the Durrani Empire and the modern state of Afghanistan, king in 1747.
These elected jirgas were often thought to be little more than mechanisms to validate the dictates of the king or prime minister. Many analysts, however, believe that the elections of 1949, 1965, and 1969 were relatively free and fair.[3]That is not to say the freely and fairly elected members of those jirgas exercised and rendered their considered judgments independently. Still, the factors and motivations that guided the members’ deliberations do not diminish the relatively democratic manner in which they were elected.
The 2004 presidential contest, which was highly touted and generally accepted as legitimate by the international community, could be considered the fourth significant electoral event in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. The first electoral event began with the UN’s selection of 25,000 local representatives who in turn elected 1,500 delegates from eight electoral zones. These 1,500 delegates attended an emergency jirga in Kabul in June 2002. In what constituted the second electoral event, these delegates elected Karzai as transitional president, after which the transitional administration was dissolved. As the third electoral event, in December 2003 caucuses elected 450 of the 500 delegates to the constitutional loya jirga, which ratified Afghanistan’s new constitution in January 2004.
The new Afghan constitution was drafted between December 14, 2003, and January 4, 2004. Officially signed on January 16, 2004, it established Afghanistan as a unitary state and provided for an elected president and bicameral national assembly. According to this constitution, no Afghan law is or can be contrary to Islam (Article 3). The state is obliged to create a prosperous, progressive society based on social justice, protection of human dignity and rights, and the realization of democracy. The state is also charged with ensuring national unity and equality among all ethnic groups and tribes. The constitution further provides that the state shall abide by the UN charter, international conventions that Afghanistan has signed, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 7).
Under its new constitution, Afghanistan has a bicameral national assembly with a president who serves as the chief of state and head of government. The president is elected by a direct vote through an absolute majority for a five-year term and can be elected for a maximum of two terms. If no candidate receives more than 50 percent of the vote in the first round of voting, the two candidates with the most votes participate in a second-round runoff election. The president has two vice presidents and a cabinet that includes 27 ministers appointed by the president and approved by the national assembly.
The bicameral National Assembly is made up of the Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) and the Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders). The National Assembly’s core responsibilities include:
The lower house, the Wolesi Jirga, is made up of 249 representatives elected directly through a Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system for five-year terms from province-wide constituencies. The number of seats allocated to each province is proportional to the population of that province (Article 83). The constitution requires that at least two women be elected from each province though the mechanism is left to the electoral law. In addition, Kuchi nomads (a pastoralist cultural group that migrates seasonally along Afghanistan river valleys) elect 10 representatives through a single national constituency.
The Wolesi Jirga’s main responsibility is to make and ratify laws, as well as to approve the president’s actions, in cooperation with the Meshrano Jirga. Specifically, the Wolesi Jirga’s duties include:
The upper house, the Meshrano Jirga, has 102 members. District councils elect one-third of its members, one per province, for three-year terms. Provincial councils choose another third, again, one per province, for four-year terms. The president appoints the final one-third to five-year terms. Half of the presidential nominees must be women, two must be representatives from the disabled and impaired communities, and two must be Kuchis (Article 84). Since district council elections were not held in 2005, when previous parliamentary elections took place, each of the 34 provincial councils was instructed to select one of its elected members to temporarily hold a seat in the house until district elections were held.
The judiciary is an independent organ of the state composed of the supreme court (Stera Mahkama), the courts of appeal, and the primary courts. The supreme court has nine members that were appointed by the president and endorsed by the Wolesi Jirga. Initially, three judges were appointed for four years, three for seven years, and three for 10 years. All subsequent appointments are for a period of 10 years. Judges for lower courts are proposed by the supreme court and at the approval of the president. In cases where no relevant constitutional provisions or laws apply, courts are allowed to utilize Hanafi jurisprudence (one of the major Sunni schools of modern Islamic judicial theory) (Article 130). The constitution also allows for the application of Shi’a jurisprudence in cases involving Shi’ites (Article 131).
Afghanistan is divided administratively into 34 provinces each with a governor appointed by the president. The governor is the representative of the central government and is in charge of all administrative issues in that province. The ministry of interior (MoI) appoints the provincial chief of police, who works in tandem with the governor on issues related to law enforcement.
Provincial councils are responsible for participating in the “attainment of the development objectives of the state and improvement of the affairs of the province in the manner prescribed by laws, and shall advise the provincial administrations on related issues” (Article 139). The constitution makes clear that the government operates according to a principle of centralism under which “the government…shall transfer necessary powers, in accordance with the law, to local administrations” (Article 137).
All provincial council members are elected by direct vote through an SNTV system to four-year terms, and the number of members in each provincial council is based on the population of each province. Subsequently, each provincial council elects one of its members to a seat in the Meshrano Jirga by an absolute majority.
Since its imposition, the Single Non-Transferable Vote system has stirred controversy in Afghanistan. While the framers of the Afghan constitution found the SNTV system simple and straightforward, given that each voter casts only one vote, critics suggest that it continues to stifle the development of political parties in Afghanistan. The system provides little incentive for candidates in multimember constituencies to embrace political party identification. It can also result in a lack of representation for minority groups and rural populations and the election of candidates with little to no support. Some argue that SNTV creates incentives for fraud given that candidates can emerge victorious with such a small share of the vote. Although the SNTV system remains in effect for provincial council and parliamentary elections in Afghanistan, its role in the electoral system remains under debate.
The 2004 presidential election, organized by the international community through the United Nations, was held on October 9, 2004. Hamid Karzai garnered 55.4 percent of the vote, three times as many votes than any other candidate.
Although there were allegations of indelible ink wearing off, multiple voting cards being issued, and ballot stuffing, the international community hailed the 2004 election as a success. The general feeling was that simply holding the elections was a success. In addition, women, long repressed by the Taliban regime, embraced their rights as Afghan citizens and participated in significant numbers in the vote.
Hamid Karzai was officially sworn in on December 7, 2004, at a formal ceremony in Kabul. His appointment symbolized a new direction for a country crippled by decades of war. On September 18, 2005, parliamentary and provincial elections were held. Allegations of fraud again delayed the results from being announced until November 12. Turnout, at 50 percent, was significantly lower than it had been in the presidential election. Women won 2 percent of the seats in the Wolesi Jirga.
According to the Constitution of Afghanistan, the president serves a five-year term. The constitution also states that the next election should be held no later than 60 days before the end of the incumbent’s term. Thus, Karzai’s term ended in July 2009, and the election should have taken place by May.
The IEC, however, was concerned about organizing a presidential election in May because inclement weather would cut off many rural areas. It would have been impossible to get the adequate number of people and election materials into place. As a result, the IEC announced the elections would be delayed until August 20, 2009. After allegations by his opponents that Karzai was extending his power unnecessarily, the president called on the IEC to respect the country’s constitution and hold the election in May. In March, the supreme court of Afghanistan affirmed the IEC’s ruling and announced that Karzai’s term would be extended until a new leader had been elected.
The legal framework for the 2009 Afghan elections starts with the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan. The Constitution states that the “citizens of Afghanistan shall have the right to elect and be elected” (Article 33). It also establishes the Independent Election Commission and grants it the authority to administer and supervise all elections (Article 156). The electoral law codifies electoral procedures administered by the IEC.
The electoral law that governed these elections was drafted in 2004 and consisted of 58 articles covering issues such as electoral administration, constituencies, voters, and candidate eligibility and registration for all four election processes (presidential, national assembly, provincial councils, and district councils). It also established the Electoral Complaints Commission. A more in-depth discussion of selection electoral laws and regulations with specific relevance to the 2009 elections is included as Appendix E.
Supporting the IEC and ECC was President Hamid Karzai’s presidential decree of noninterference, dated May 20, 2009. In the decree President Karzai, as the country’s chief executive officer and the official responsible for IEC appointments, sets forth the Afghan government’s policy that prohibits interference by any person or organization, foreign or domestic, with the process of free and fair elections. Violators were subject to arrest and prosecution.[4]
The Independent Election Commission is responsible for administering and supervising election activities in Afghanistan, including voter and candidate registration, the campaign and voting processes, and certification of election results. The UN supervised the administration of elections in 2004 and 2005, but the IEC organized the 2009 elections largely on its own, with the UN assisting in a support role.[5]The president appointed all seven members of the IEC, which included a president and a vice president.[6]
The secretariat is the executive body of the IEC in Kabul, with offices located in all provinces. The secretariat is managed by the chief electoral officer, who is also appointed by the president of the country based on input from the IEC. The secretariat is empowered to select central, provincial, and district-level electoral officials.[7]
For the August 20, 2009, elections, the IEC attempted to communicate regularly with stakeholders. It conducted regular press conferences and coordination meetings with presidential candidates, presidential candidate liaison officers, political party representatives, domestic observers, and international observers.
Although ballot counting in previous elections took place in the provincial capitals, counting for the August 20 poll took place in each polling station immediately after polls closed. Counting of provincial council ballots in Kabul, Herat, Baghlan, and Nangarhar took place on the following day, August 21, due to the large number of provincial council candidates.[8]Tabulation of results took place in the National Tally Center in Kabul. To win in the first round a presidential candidate had to receive more than 50 percent of the valid votes cast. If no candidate met this threshold, a runoff between the top two candidates was to be held within two weeks of the announcement of the results.[9]
The IEC planned 6,969 polling centers and 28,663 polling stations. The final numbers were subject to security reviews, and a number of polling centers did not open due to security concerns. It was estimated that approximately 164,000 polling staff members would be needed to conduct the elections, including 7,000 polling station managers, 2,500 assistant polling center managers, and 3,000 polling center queue controllers.[10]
Each polling station had five staff members: (1) polling station chairperson, (2) queue controller, (3) identification/inking officer, (4) ballot paper issuer, and (5) ballot box controller. The election commission reportedly recruited 28,655 people to fill these positions.
Approximately 18 million presidential ballots and 18 million provincial council ballots were printed at secure overseas printing houses to ensure quality control and security features to prevent tampering or counterfeiting. For ease of identification, presidential ballots were green and provincial council ballots were brown. In addition, 400,000 sample ballots were printed as part of the public outreach effort.[11]Ballot papers, official ballot stamps, completed election-result forms, and indelible ink were considered sensitive. Important nonsensitive items included empty ballot boxes, voting screens, ballot box seals, tamper-evident bags, and journals. Most nonsensitive materials and supplies were provided in the form of prepackaged polling station kits, counting kits, and polling center kits. The IEC employed 174 logistics and warehouse staff members in Kabul to prepare election materials and deliver them to the provinces. The IEC used a fleet of more than 3,000 vehicles, 3,000 donkeys, three helicopters, one airplane, and additional air assets from ISAF and Afghan security forces, where needed.
The Electoral Complaints Commission of Afghanistan is an independent body responsible for adjudicating all complaints concerning the electoral process. Under Article 52 of the electoral law, the ECC shall have the jurisdiction to consider and adjudicate: (a) complaints relating to electoral offenses, including violations of the law in the conduct of the electoral process, provided that the complaint has been received before the certification of the election results; and (b) challenges to the list of candidates or to the eligibility or qualifications of a candidate raised during the electoral process. The challenges include requirements for candidate’s age, citizenship, and voter registration, as well as links to illegal armed groups and restrictions on holding certain government offices.[12]
In 2009, the ECC had five members. Two of them were Afghan nationals, one appointed by the supreme court and the other appointed by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. The other three members were experts from other countries, appointed by the special representative of the secretary-general of the United Nations. The ECC also established provincial election complaints commissions (PECCs) in each province. In total, the ECC/PECCs counted 176 staff members, all of whom were Afghans.
When the commission was formally constituted on April 26, 2009, it was entirely dependent on international funding. The ECC only became functional in mid-May, when funds became available, while many PECCs experienced problems establishing their infrastructure and did not become operational until mid-June, just two months before election day. For the period of candidate challenges, the ECC worked through focal points at IEC provincial offices. Those focal points were responsible for collecting challenges and referring them to the ECC in Kabul.
Any person or organization who had a valid interest in the electoral process and who claimed there had been a violation of law regarding the conduct of the electoral process could file a complaint with the ECC.[13]Complaints had to be in writing and could be filed at any provincial branch of the ECC or the central ECC office in Kabul within 72 hours of the occurrence of the alleged violation or the time that it became known to the complainant.[14]Complaint forms were available, but using them was not mandatory.[15]
The ECC/PECCs were empowered to hold hearings and conduct investigations. If a PECC considered a complaint to be well founded, the subject of the complaint was to be notified, if possible, and given an opportunity to respond. Such a response then had to be submitted within five days of notification. At ECC headquarters, three regional teams processed and investigated cases. Provincial commissions could decide on the dismissal of a claim, a warning (appropriate for most minor complaints), or remedial action (e.g., removal of posters) with immediate effect. Those decisions could be appealed. The ECC reviewed all decisions that imposed sanctions or fines before they became final. Despite the focus on capacity-building, international advisors drafted most of the decisions since local capacity to write a legal analysis was largely lacking.
Appeals against the decisions of PECCs could be filed to the ECC within three days of the notification.[16]According to the electoral law, decisions of the ECC were final (Article 52). Complaints filed just before, on, and after election day were sent directly to ECC Kabul and screened as to whether they might have an impact on the final results. If so, they were classified as “Priority A” complaints. The electoral law also called for the ECC to complete its work no later than 30 days after the certification of results (Article 52).
The voter registration process for the 2009 elections occurred in different locations around the country in four phases between October 2008 and February 2009 (see Table 1). Voter registration began on October 6, 2008, and ended on February 18, 2009, although there were still a number of centers where people could register to vote until the day before the elections.
This process, which was funded by international aid agencies, registered 4.5 million new voters for a total of approximately 17 million voters in the country. Of the new voters, according to the IEC, approximately 38 percent were female.
|
Table 1: Phases of Voter Registration |
||
|
Phase |
Dates |
Provinces |
|
First |
Oct. 6 – Nov. 4, 2009 |
Badakshan, Bamyan, Dikundi, Ghazni, Ghor, Kapisa, Kunar, Logar, Nuristan, Parwan, Sari Pul, Takhar, and Wardak |
|
Second |
Nov. 5 – Dec. 4, 2008 |
Badghis, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Heart, Jozjan, Kabul, Kunduz, and Samangan |
|
Third |
Dec. 12, 2008 – Jan. 12, 2009 |
Farah, Laghman, Khost, Nangahar, Paktia, Paktika, and Zabul |
|
Fourth |
Jan. 20 – Feb. 18, 2009 |
Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan |
|
Source: Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan |
||
The IEC accredited both media and observer organizations to monitor the registration process. The commission accredited 36 media outlets and provided a total of 2,204 accreditation badges to media and observers.
The Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA) was the only organization, either international or domestic, to observe the voter registration process. FEFA provided a comprehensive review its observation of the voter registration process through a series of four reports on the phases of voter registration. The following are the major violations that occurred during the voter registration period as reported by FEFA:
The Afghan electoral law set the voting age at 18 (Article 13), but FEFA witnessed many voter cards being given to people who were clearly younger than 18.
When it established October 2009 as the month in which elections would be held, the IEC decided that individuals who turned 18 by September 2009 would be eligible to vote. After the commencement of the registration process, however, the IEC moved the election date up to August 20, 2009, which resulted in a situation where people younger than 18 years of age had acquired voter cards and would therefore be able to vote in the election even though they were underage.
The Afghan electoral law states that, “Each voter shall have one vote in the elections and shall vote only on his or her own behalf” (Article 4). During its observation of the voter registration process, FEFA witnessed people registering multiple times on numerous occasions. By interviewing people in the vicinity of the registration centers, FEFA was able to identify a large number of people that actually volunteered to show their multiple cards.
FEFA blamed this problem on the complicity of IEC staff members and the IEC’s failure to put mechanisms in place that would allow it to detect and prohibit this violation. On average, FEFA reported that there were incidents of multiple registrations in 50 percent of registration centers where they fielded observers. This was particularly prevalent throughout the third phase of voter registration, during which FEFA’s observation suggests 85 percent of registration centers allowed multiple registrations.[17]
During its observation, FEFA often observed election officials demonstrating bias, in direct violation of the electoral law (Article 9). In addition, FEFA found that some electoral officials were not competent. FEFA cited the example of some IEC staff members using their authority to change the location of voter registration centers to areas that favored particular candidates.
The Afghan electoral law states that, “Voters and candidates shall take part in the elections on the basis of their own free will. Imposition of any kind of direct or indirect restriction on voters or candidates on the basis of language, religious, ethnic, gender, tribal, geographical, or social status is prohibited” (Article 5.) FEFA witnessed many instances of election officials allowing men to register female family members, often based on lists of women’s names that they brought to the center. Based on the man’s claim that the listed women were his relatives, election officials would provide voting cards based on the names on the list and issue cards without a photograph and with the man’s fingerprint instead of the woman’s.
In choosing locations for voter registration centers, the IEC failed to consider certain cultural and practical considerations, including the distance of registration centers from places where many voters lived, centers located in buildings that women were uncomfortable entering, the failure to provide enough Kuchi-specific centers, and the lack of female registration staff members.
The IEC’s regulations on voter registration provided that media, observers, political party agents, and candidates may be present in any voter registration center upon accreditation. The IEC was slow to process and issue accreditation cards to media and observer organizations, which limited coverage.
The number of women registered for the 2009 elections was lower than for the 2004 elections. FEFA suggested that there were three main reasons for low female participation in the voter registration process in 2009: (1) a relative lack of female registration center staff members, particularly in rural areas; (2) poor security, particularly in the southern provinces; and (3) centers located in government buildings where it may be culturally inappropriate for women to enter.[18]
The deteriorating security situation also impeded people’s access to voter registration. During the first phase of the voter registration process, there were a large number of voter registration centers that were closed intermittently, or sometimes permanently, in several provinces including Ghazni, Wardak, Ghor, Logar, and Nuristan.[19]
During the second phase of registration, the security forces took additional measures to create a more stable environment for registration to take place, although a handful of incidents did still occur, including several suicide attacks. Although the suicide attacks did not specifically target registration centers, they effectively discouraged people from registering to vote.
At the beginning of the third phase of registration, there were two incidents in which IEC staff members were kidnapped (in Farrah and Paktika provinces). They were eventually released, but this created an atmosphere of insecurity and apprehension and likely deterred people from registering.[20]There were a few centers in Zabul province that could not open at all due to security issues and some centers in Paktika province had delayed openings. There were also reports of “night letters” – notices left in the night threatening the lives of any Afghans working to support the election process – being sent in the provinces of Nangahar, Khost, and Laghman.
The fourth phase took place in the most insecure provinces including Helmand and Kandahar. It was apparent to FEFA observers that security forces did a good job ensuring a portion of the population could register, but the deteriorating security situation did in fact negatively affect registration, particularly in rural areas.[21]The difficult security situation resulted in the inability of the IEC to establish registration centers in seven of the 25 districts in Helmand and Kandahar provinces. In addition, rumors of Taliban threats to prevent people from registering to vote had a negative impact on participation, especially for women.
The security concerns, however, did not prevent the process from taking place. FEFA estimated that only 20 of approximately 400 registration centers were closed due to security concerns.[22]
Perhaps the greatest impediment to the election process was the lack of an accurate voter list. The IEC was unable to produce a list of voters that combined those registered in 2004 with those registered in 2009 and eliminated any duplicate registrations. As a result, no voter list was used in polling stations during the August 20 elections. Rather than being pre-assigned a polling station and having their names checked off a list, voters could cast ballots for the presidential election at any polling station in the country. Although this may have simplified the voting process, it also increased the risk of fraud. With fraudulent registration cards, additional votes could be cast at any number of centers.
Many Afghans who previously registered in 2004 re-registered before the 2009 elections not with the intent to cast fraudulent ballots, but simply because the new cards were better. They had photos and other biometric data that made them more useful forms of ID, which are not easy to get in Afghanistan. However, there were also allegations that the voter registration process produced large numbers of fake voter cards, cards that did not correspond to real people.
Candidates submitted their nominations in writing to the IEC between April 25, 2009, and May 8, 2009. A challenge period between May 16 and May 21, 2009, allowed the public to submit evidence that a nominated candidate was not qualified or eligible to run for office under the applicable laws. The ECC was charged with the responsibility of reviewing challenges and complaints of nominated candidates. Challenges specifically referred to the qualifications, as outlined in the constitution and electoral law, of nominated candidates. Complaints, on the other hand, did not have a cut-off period, could be made throughout the election process, and could relate to any electoral offense or any other violation of an electoral rule. According to the electoral law, challenges and complaints could be filed by any person or entity with a legitimate interest in the elections (Article 36.2), and all decisions of the ECC were final with no further appeal or recourse (Article 52.6).
During the challenge period, a total of 302 challenges were filed from 31 provinces against presidential and provincial council candidates in 26 provinces. Approximately half the presidential candidates had challenges made against them. One presidential candidate and 90 provincial candidates (including 13 female candidates) voluntarily withdrew their candidacy in response to the complaints received by the ECC office. A total of 57 candidates were disqualified for other reasons. Those included two presidential candidates, one vice presidential candidate, and 54 provincial council candidates.[23]
Among the challenges were allegations of dual citizenship, affiliations with illegally armed groups, criminal activity, and failure to resign as required from government posts. The ECC investigated each challenge, and candidates were informed of the nature of the challenge and given until 4:00 pm on May 29, 2009, to respond and to comply with the eligibility requirements or otherwise show that the challenge was unfounded.[24]The ECC used a clear and convincing standard of proof, and the burden fell to the challenger or complainant to demonstrate that the candidate was not qualified or was otherwise ineligible.[25]
On June 9, 2009, the ECC provided the IEC with the names of two presidential candidates, one vice presidential candidate, and 54 provincial council candidates who did not meet the qualifications required for being successfully nominated. The remaining challenges were dismissed. Of the 57 successful challenges, 56 persons were found to effectively command or be a member of an unofficial military force in contravention of the electoral law (Article 15.3). One of the 56 persons disqualified was also disqualified for having been convicted of a crime. Another presidential candidate was disqualified because he was found to have dual citizenship in the United States.[26]
The ECC also imposed fines ranging from 20,000 to 50,000 Afghanis on two presidential and two provincial council candidates for providing false information to the IEC about their candidacy at the time of their nomination. The ECC sent warning letters to two other candidates for submitting frivolous challenges. As the ECC only dealt with electoral offenses, it referred a significant number of challenges to the Attorney General, the joint secretariat of the Disarmament and Reconciliation Commission, and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission.[27]
To determine the order of the multitude of candidates on the ballot, the IEC organized a ballot lottery for presidential and provincial candidates. On June 12, 2009, the commission conducted the lottery in the presence of candidate agents, observer entities, media, and other stakeholders. Before the printing of the ballots, the next candidate in the lottery replaced disqualified candidates. If candidates were disqualified or withdrew after the printing of the ballot, their names would remain on the ballot and would be dealt with during counting as described below.[28]
The ECC received a total of 433 complaints during the two-month electoral campaign period. Approximately one quarter of the complaints concerned the presidential election, 129 complaints concerned provincial council candidates, and the remainder were filed against other organizations or individuals involved in the electoral process, including the IEC. By August 18, 2009, the ECC had adjudicated 169 of the complaints and announced that they expected the majority of complaints to be resolved before election day.[29]
Afghan law does not place limits on the financing of campaigns but does contain provisions regarding the provenance of funds used for campaigning. Under the electoral law, an electoral offense exists when campaign activities make use of “funds originating from illegal activities” or “foreign funds” (Article 53).
To comply with its duty to ensure that candidates abide by electoral law, the IEC approved on March 25 a Regulation on Political Campaign Finance (RPCF) setting out requirements for proper record-keeping and postelection reporting. This Regulation received further support from an IEC decision that required candidates to produce similar interim campaign finance reports every 15 days throughout the campaign period. The requirements applied only to candidates in the presidential election.
The RPCF provided that only Afghan citizens and registered political parties could contribute to a campaign. It also required candidates to keep records of, and submit reports on, campaign contributions (including loans) and expenses. Further, it limited the scope of contributions made by any arm of the Afghan government to the area of security; all other services and resources offered had to be made freely and equally available to all candidates.
The recording and reporting regulations were not onerous. The provisions required presidential candidates to:
Failure to file a complete final report without a satisfactory reason should have resulted in the barring of a candidate from running in future elections. It is not clear, however, what constituted satisfactory reason, and there did not appear to be a penalty for late submission of final reports. Failure to produce interim reports required the IEC to report the candidate to the ECC, which could, in turn, take appropriate action.
The Afghan constitution empowers the IEC to regulate the activities of political parties and candidates for office (Article 156). The electoral law (Article 38) and the electoral campaign regulation (Article 3) charge the IEC with responsibility for announcing the election-campaign period, which is to start at least 120 days before the election. The IEC, the media commission, and the ECC are empowered to investigate any claims of campaign violations and adjudicate those claims or refer them for prosecution (Electoral Campaign Regulation, Article 5). The election campaign regulation also limits the role of government officials, directing them to avoid intervening on behalf of specific candidates or parties in either a positive or negative way (Article 7). All campaign activity had to cease 48 hours before the polling day (Article 8). The presidential decree of May 21, 2009 prohibited government institutions and officials from interfering in the process. The decree prohibited interference in the election process, including voter, candidate, and campaign activities and materials. It also prohibited the use of government resources to the benefit or detriment of candidates or the award or termination of government positions for the purpose of influencing any election activities.[30]
Several prominent NGOs charged that the misuse of government resources was a significant issue during the campaign period. In a report on July 27, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) concluded that the biggest problem as of that date was the use of government resources to promote candidates. An AIHRC representative commented that a delay in establishing the Electoral Complaints Commission, particularly the provincial offices was unfortunate. He noted that until then the IEC was the only forum to register complaints, even though some of the complaints involved the IEC.[31]
A representative of FEFA agreed that the misuse of government resources was a major problem and criticized the lack of a level playing field for presidential candidates. During the June 16-July 16 observation period, FEFA observed misuse of government resources and lack of impartiality throughout the country.[32]FEFA also stated in a July 7 press release that violations had not decreased since the voter registration and candidate nomination stages of the electoral process.[33]
The fall of the Taliban in 2001 sparked an unprecedented expansion of media activity in Afghanistan. In most rural areas many communities rely on radio as a source of information. For those Afghans who could afford electricity and a television, alternatives to the state broadcaster, Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA), began to emerge. In 2004, few TV stations covered the election. Five years later, hundreds of different media outlets were accessible, including some 400 radio stations and more than 20 television stations.
Widely described as an unparalleled opportunity for freedom of speech in the region, millions of foreign dollars flowed into Afghanistan to fund radio stations, television networks, and newspapers. In the early days, these media outlets were free to report openly and were not bothered by the government or antigovernment factions. In retrospect, the early days were a golden age, when journalists were largely free from censorship and intimidation.
Media experts agree that media development in Afghanistan has been one of the country’s greatest successes since the fall of the Taliban. But the increase in media outlets has not resulted in an increase in the quality of the reporting. In many cases, what started as a movement toward free media in 2001 has morphed into an environment of media factionalism, in which privately run companies compete as soapboxes for those with money or power. According to many analysts, the government and some private media owners exercise strict editorial control over the content that reaches the general public.
For some media outlets, the freedom of expression that existed after the fall of the Taliban seems increasingly threatened. According to a leading figure in the Media Commission, journalists face two major problems: the government and the Taliban. “The government withholds information from the media and in case journalists broadcast [criticisms] against the government, they face jail time and beating. The Taliban also sometimes kills or kidnaps journalists.”[34]In July 2009, for example, police officers in Herat beat five journalists for reporting on a public demonstration and police corruption.[35]
Media coverage has played an important role in educating the country about the electoral process. The IEC accredited 49 national media organizations and 138 international media houses to observe and report on the August 20 elections. TV stations such as TOLO, Ariana, and RTA hosted debates and serious political discussions. This differed markedly from the role media played in the 2004 election.
Even so, journalists faced significant challenges reporting on the 2009 elections. The Taliban and other antigovernment groups increased attacks against journalists and denied reporters access to many areas of the country. Some journalists who monitored government conduct during the elections accused government officials of harassment.
The Institute for War & Peace Reporting reported that one radio station in Ghazni, under pressure from Taliban demands, changed its programming to reflect what the Taliban considered acceptable. Specifically, the station eliminated western-style entertainment programming in favor of religious broadcasts and traditional Afghan music.
The Afghan Foreign Ministry demanded on Wednesday, August 19, that news organizations “avoid broadcasting any incidence of violence” between 6 a.m. and 5 p.m. on election day to “ensure the wide participation of the Afghan people.” The English version of the statement said media “are requested” to follow the guidelines, but the Dari version said broadcasting news or video from a “terrorist attack” was “forbidden.” A previous version in Dari had more strongly said that such reporting was “strictly forbidden” and called for a blackout until 8 p.m.
TOLO television owner Saad Mohseni stated publically that his station was prepared to hold back reports of violence on election day to ensure as many voters as possible would go to the polls. But other Afghan journalists alleged that, by ordering national and international media to censor reports of violence on election day, the government was violating the constitution.
There was considerable concern regarding the efficacy of the IEC’s Media Code of Conduct. International journalists complained that the code of conduct was designed to prevent Afghan journalists from accurately reporting on contentious issues important to revealing the true character of candidates. Leading up to election day, the Media Commission reported a number of complaints from candidates against news agencies for biased coverage, despite the code of conduct. Some journalists also alleged that the Media Commission itself was not impartial.
The IEC tracked the percentage of air time that was allocated to each candidate by each news outlet. According to media monitoring figures provided by the IEC on August 12, President Karzai received 72 percent of coverage in government-run media, compared to just 12 percent for Abdullah Abdullah and 5 percent for Ashraf Ghani. The state broadcaster, RTA, argued that the heavy focus on Karzai was a result of his prolific campaigning, which far outpaced the other candidates. According to the IEC, on Aina Television, which is owned by Abdul Rashid Dostum (a Karzai supporter), Karzai received 92.8 percent of coverage, compared to 0.2 percent for Ashraf Ghani.
The Media Monitoring Commission of the IEC accused some electronic and print media outlets of violating the 48 hours period of silence before election day. One local analyst accused some private outlets, including Noorin, Tamadun, Tolo, and Shamshad, of telecasting advertisements in favor of candidates beyond the end of the campaign period.
After the fall of the Taliban and the accompanying influx of foreign assistance, the number of civil society organizations (CSOs) increased rapidly in Afghanistan. According to the OSCE, there were more than 500 legitimate CSOs by 2003.[36]
There has also been a noticeable increase in CSOs becoming more engaged in electoral activities. Civil society organizations can contribute to elections by verifying that elections run smoothly and that all parties (including the government and candidates) abide by the law.[37]Thus, during the election period, there was an upsurge in civil society activity, which was fueled by the increase in foreign assistance money for election-related programs, including election observation. CSOs like FEFA and the AIHRC had reasonable access to official processes during the pre-election period, although following up on complaints and alleged violations was somewhat problematic. A UNAMA representative admitted that while the IEC and ECC (and PECCs) accept complaints and in theory those complaints could be referred to the Ministry of Justice, there was rarely any follow-up or satisfactory resolution.[38]
The director of a prominent Afghan CSO suggested that although voter interest had at least temporarily decreased, CSO engagement would continue to grow.[39]
FEFA organized the most comprehensive domestic observer mission for the 2009 elections. Although in previous elections FEFA monitored only the voting and counting processes, this time it observed voter registration, candidate registration, and pre-election activities. Through a series of training-of-trainer (TOT) sessions, provincial representatives received training and then traveled to recruit and train district representatives. Although FEFA originally focused on misuse of government resources, as the election drew closer it switched its focus to reporting on the campaign environment and voter intimidation.[40]
For the 2004 presidential election, FEFA deployed approximately 2,300 observers and monitored 101 districts throughout the country. Approximately 135 observers monitored out-of-country voting in Peshawar, Pakistan. FEFA was unable to obtain visas to monitor out-of-country voting in Iran. For the 2005 Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council elections, FEFA deployed observers to each province in Afghanistan and covered 217 districts including up to 65 percent of the polling facilities.
For the 2009 elections, FEFA reported it deployed 7,368 electoral observers, of which 2,642 were female, to all 34 provinces. Four hundred of these were long-term observers who monitored the entire electoral process, including voter and candidate registration.[41]FEFA estimated that on election day it had 60 percent coverage throughout the entire country and was present in all 34 provinces. Because of security issues, FEFA’s weakest coverage was in Zabul and Wardak.[42]This represented a significant increase in observation efforts from the 2004 and 2005 elections. FEFA did not report any observers attacked, injured, or killed.
Thus, domestic election monitoring was more extensive than the last election. That roughly 7,000 observers were deployed is a success in and of itself and suggests that FEFA has the logistical capacity to perform widespread monitoring again in the future.
Although the actual coverage and impact are difficult to measure, dozens of CSOs reportedly conducted voter education in the lead-up to the elections. The Afghan Civil Society Forum (ACSF), for example, supported voter education through small grants, public outreach, and specific voter education projects. The Cooperation Center for Afghanistan (CCA), which has offices in Kabul, Bamyan, and Balkh, conducted voter education programs in the Northern provinces. The CCA reported that although its programs were successful citizens showed significantly less interest in the elections than in previous years.[43]
The Civil Society & Human Rights Network (CSHRN) had no specific funds for election-related projects but did support a bi-monthly election magazine. The Network had a small amount of funds for general civil education as well as a weekly newsletter and radio program that often discussed election rules and procedures. Informally, the CSHRN organized meetings and debates for its member organizations to discuss electoral, human rights, and women’s issues. However, no media or outside organizations or individuals were invited to attend these events.[44]
The Kabul-based Afghan National Participation Organization (ANPO) appeared to be one of the more active and effective civil society organizations. A founding member of FEFA, ANPO trained approximately 1,000 domestic election monitors for the 22 Kabul districts and conducted a long-term public governance radio program. During the months leading up to the election, ANPO produced four weekly political and election-related debate programs that were distributed to more than 40 regional radio stations.[45]
Voter education outreach to women remained a challenge in 2009. Many CSOs, such as the New Afghanistan Women’s Association (NAWA) and the Afghan Women’s Educational Center (AWEC), were actively involved in voter education campaigns for women. The Afghan Women’s Network (AWN) organized one successful initiative, known as the Five Million Women Campaign, that brought together more than one thousand prominent women in a nationwide women’s political participation campaign.
Most voter education programs were organized, coordinated, and funded with support from UNDP-Elect. Working at the provincial capital, district, and community levels, UNDP-Elect voter education focused on roles and responsibilities of government institutions and individual voters, information about the IEC and ECC, and how to participate in the electoral process. UNDP-Elect used a variety of outreach methods, including public service announcements, radio and television programs, mobile theater, small seminars, individual meetings, and public workshops. The Open Society Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy sponsored similar voter-education programs.
On the surface, the level of cooperation among CSOs was impressive, and their voter education and election monitoring programs reached a level never before seen in Afghanistan. The actual level of citizen outreach to outlying provinces was unclear. The majority of the country’s registered CSOs are based in Kabul, and there was a common perception that most voter education activities targeted the big cities but not much was done in the rural areas.[46]
Nearly half of responding NGOs in one survey identified education and health as their main fields of activity; only 30 percent indicated that they worked in voter and civic education.[47]From interviews with several NGO leaders in Kabul, it appears they have a difficult time articulating their understanding of advocacy and capacity-building programs, and many of the public outreach and civic education programs were vague and abstract. Capacity-building programs of CSOs in Afghanistan fail to provide enough emphasis or resources at the rural-community level.
Compared to previous elections there seems to have been an increase in civic and election education campaigns targeted at women, led by women’s NGOs such as AWEC and NAWA. This included the Five Million Women Campaign, spearheaded by IFES with support from the Afghan Women’s Network. This campaign sought to help facilitate an engaged and informed voting population by emphasizing the importance and acceptability of women’s participation in the electoral process in Afghanistan.[48]
Women in Afghanistan face profound challenges to participation in elections and public life. These challenges include a very low literacy rate estimated, at around 16 percent for women compared to 31 percent for men, and a high mortality rate, estimated at 1,600 to 1,900 deaths per 100,000 live births (the second highest maternal mortality rate in the world).[49]Social discrimination and violence remain widespread; according to one survey, domestic violence still occurs in an estimated 95 percent of households.[50]Poverty and traditional cultural practices inhibit the ability of women to access basic services and resources and limit their ability to participate in the political process.
After the fall of the Taliban, support and advocacy for the promotion and protection of women’s rights began, and, with pressure from the international community, the post-Taliban Afghan government established the first Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Women’s groups, activists, and human rights organizations from inside and outside Afghanistan ensured that the new constitution contained language ensuring equality of men and women. Specifically, the constitution says, “Any kind of discrimination and distinction between citizens of Afghanistan shall be forbidden. The citizens of Afghanistan, man and woman, have equal rights and duties before the law.” (Article 22.)
Although the constitution of Afghanistan guarantees equal rights, women throughout the country remain in a position of relative inequality, especially when it comes to decision-making at both personal and public levels. Women represent 27 percent of the National Assembly (68 out of 249 seats in Wolesi Jirga, 23 out of 102 in the Meshrano Jirga) and 26 percent of all civil servants.[51]
For the 2009 presidential campaign, two female candidates registered: Shahla Ata and Dr. Frozan Fana. There were also three female vice presidential candidates in 2009. This compared to one presidential and two vice presidential candidates in 2004. Although these numbers may seem encouraging, women remain politically marginalized, both in the ability to voice their views in the National Assembly and in terms of ministerial representation in the government.
According to the electoral law, 124 seats are reserved for women in the provincial council elections. Out of 3,324 candidates for provincial elections in 2009, 10 percent (342) were women.[52]This number is comparable to the 2005 election. One reason given for such a low turnout of women provincial candidates was the fact that the Afghan election law states that each provincial council candidate must present signatures and voter registration card numbers from 200 supporters as part of the registration process (10,000 signatures were required for presidential candidates). One analyst suggested that women candidates had particular difficulty convincing men to provide their voter card numbers in support of female candidates.[53]
During the election nomination process for provincial council elections, which took place from April 28 to May 8, 2009, the initial number of women registering to run as provincial council candidates was extremely low. After raising this concern with the IEC, The Asia Foundation subsequently broadcast a service announcement on radio stations throughout the country during the last days of the nomination period encouraging women to run. Women parliamentarians andwomen’s rights groups held a number of press conferences encouraging women become candidates, both at the presidential and provincial levels.The number of female candidates who registered in the last three days of the nomination period jumped from 94 to more than 300. TAF believes this is, in large part, attributable to its service announcements.[54]
Women candidates typically found it difficult to campaign. In the provinces, particularly in the more remote and conservative areas, women often had to campaign in their burqas. They also were generally unable to put up posters with their photos, as this was considered indecent and un-Islamic.[55]Women often limited their campaigning to small campaign meetings inside the houses of their female supporters.[56]Most observers believed that the more publicity a female candidate received, the more likely she was to become a target of threats or violence.
Security was a serious cause for concern for women candidates. It became such an issue that the government offered armed security guards to female candidates. Specifically, the government offered to provide one person of the candidate’s choice with a gun, one week’s worth of security training, and a salary (equivalent to the lowest grade police officer).[57]Nevertheless, a number of women provincial candidates told DI before the election that the government was not taking security threats seriously enough. They argued that this last-minute plan, as they called it, was inadequate, especially for women candidates in high-risk provinces, particularly the south. Although male and female candidates face many of the same security concerns, there was broad agreement that women were particularly vulnerable.
Election authorities had difficulty finding enough women to work in polling centers throughout the country. Stakeholders estimated that to adequately staff all of the female polling stations, the IEC would need 80,000 female workers. It is unclear how many women the IEC was able to recruit, but it was far short of this number.
According to Najla Ayubi from TAF in Kabul, securing female national observers for the elections was also problematic. The lack of female Afghan observers might have made fraud more possible, given that the women’s polling stations were separate from men’s.[58]
One leading expert on gender issues in Kabul explained to DI that current social norms have led many women to consider the public and political spheres to be a male domain. Many women do not see voting as their responsibility. By extension, they also look for guidance or approval from their husband or family about their choices of candidates about or before running as candidates.[59]Even more than men, women also lack access to media and information.
A number of NGOs, both international and national, conducted campaigns to encourage women to vote and run as candidates at the provincial level. One such example is the Five Million Women Campaign mentioned above. This campaign provided civic education to women throughout the country on their rights to vote and to run as candidates at both the national and provincial levels. This campaign should be seen as a stepping stone to more in-depth regional and provincial public outreach programs for women to understand their rights as individuals, voters, and candidates.
Despite these public campaigns to encourage women to vote in the 2009 elections, many analysts suggest that such efforts were less extensive and less organized than in 2004. Coupled with increased security issues (particularly in the South and East), the decreased participation of women could be seen as a step backwards.[60]Women’s participation in Afghan politics and elections will continue to be a determinant of the ultimate success of the consolidation of democracy in Afghanistan.
Despite the overall decline in female voter registration, there were implausibly high levels of female registration in some of the more insecure, traditionally conservative, provinces. In the city of Logar, for example, more than twice as many voter cards were issued to women as to men (36,000 women to 14,000 men). An even higher ratio was recorded in the town of Nuristan (31,000 to 12,000). There were similar patterns in the Pashtun-majority southeast. In the 2009 voter registration process, the three southeastern provinces of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost saw 205,000 female registrations against 167,000 males. In contrast, in the neighboring four southern provinces (Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul and Helmand), where many of the same conservative cultural norms apply, there were 196,000 women to 363,000 men. There is reason to believe that this enabled “proxy voting” (men in traditional communities registering and voting on behalf of women in their families) and may have facilitated fraud in these regions.[61]
An example of this type of fraud was evident in the 2005 parliamentary polls where 90,000 of the 166,000 new voter cards that were issued in Paktika had women’s names. Female turnout during that year’s poll was evidently so implausibly high that it has never been publicly released – the only province for which such a breakdown was not provided. Despite this history, authorities failed to take any additional action to tighten safeguards against this type of fraud, which would seem to require the complicity of local election staff members. The 2009 voter registration update, for instance, reported that in Paktika 44,000 women had registered, just under the number of men at 45,000. FEFA believed, however, that the only female registration cards directly issued to women in 2009 were provided to those in a hospital.[62]
Although security was always going to feature prominently in the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections, at times it looked as if the escalating violence might prevent the elections from taking place altogether. Some political actors and analysts went so far as to suggest alternatives such as a Loya Jirga, a state of emergency, or a transitional administration.[63]
The deteriorating security environment was not simply an election-related phenomenon but rather a continuation of the ongoing violence that has plagued Afghanistan in recent years. There were approximately 30 more security incidents reported during the second quarter of 2009 than in the same quarter in 2008, highlighting a disturbing trend in which the number of incidents climbed to record levels.[64]In keeping with these troubling statistics, July was the deadliest month to that date for international military forces, providing an ominous precursor to an August election.
This ongoing threat of violence had a significant impact on both accessibility and participation. The United Nations estimated that of the 360 districts that make up Afghanistan, at least 10 were not under government control while a further 165 were difficult or problematic to access.[65]These areas of instability represented a serious challenge to election planners. Just a month before the election more than 15 percent of proposed polling centers remained in doubt for security reasons. This figure was eventually reduced to 10 percent by election day, with 6,289 polling centers opening around the country.[66]
Security forces made a concerted effort to secure volatile areas ahead of the August elections and these operations appear to have achieved some success. In Helmand, for example, U.S. forces retook Reig Khan Shin and Nawe Barakzai districts, which had been out of government control, while in North-Central Helmand UK forces claimed to have secured 100,000 Afghan civilians with Operation Panther’s Claw, the second and third stages of which were specifically designed to hold ground and prepare for the elections.[67]
Even in locations where security forces were successful in temporarily dislodging antigovernment elements, a significant portion of the population was still dissuaded from taking part in the process. Antigovernment elements pursued an aggressive campaign of threats and intimidation in the run-up to election day. Intimidation ranged from “night letters” to threats that anyone found with indelible ink on their finger would have that finger chopped off or worse. In some cases, threats were followed by action. A district coordinator from Wardak (Chak District) was abducted in late July. But in most instances, the threats appear to have been empty, intended only to keep Afghans away from the polls.[68]In addition to affecting voter turnout in some districts, this campaign of intimidation also led to difficulties in recruiting and retaining staff to manage the process.
The Afghan National Police (ANP) appeared to lack both the numbers and the capacity to effectively support an operation of this magnitude. Although the ANP reported that the number of its officers exceeded 75,000, against an agreed ceiling of 82,000, election-security planners posit that the actual numbers were significantly lower, with estimates ranging from 40,000 to 50,000.[69]As with past elections, the government’s response to this shortfall was to hire large numbers of Arbakai (tribal security) to secure remote polling centers in 18 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.[70]Although these personnel did not receive uniforms or weapons from authorities, their continued involvement in the election process raised serious questions about the perception of intimidation at polling centers.[71]
In addition to a shortage of trained police personnel, several sources commented that the ANP lacked the capacity to effectively plan and execute an operation of this scale. As the lead organization and the “face of elections security,” the ANP should have been the central hub for election-security planning. Its failure to embrace this role, however, appears to have led security stakeholders to plan and prepare in isolation, which resulted in a series of individual plans rather than one coherent strategy. The utter absence of MoI and MoD representation at weekly election stakeholders meetings further demonstrated the problem; ISAF was the only security stakeholder that attended such meetings regularly.
Pre-election violence targeted government officials, candidates, and international forces. The Taliban apparently hoped to demonstrate its reach and to intimidate citizens to deter them from voting on August 20. The insurgency used a three-pronged strategy for disrupting the elections. First, they escalated attacks on coalition forces. This fueled the perception of overall insecurity. Second was a campaign of intimidation against Afghans working on the electoral process. Using fear tactics such as “night letters” and attacks on election officials and candidates, the insurgents hoped to scare a majority of Afghans from going to the polls. The last tactic was attacks on Kabul in the days leading up to the August 20 elections. These attacks at the center of the most heavily secured city in the country were evidently intended to ripple through society and weaken international resolve.
Before the elections, there were a number of threats against the IEC staff (including IEC civic educators) if they did not stop their work. As a result, some IEC staff members resigned. Abductions of election officials became an issue toward the end of June and continued through to the August 20 elections. Nine IEC staff members were reported abducted, including three district field coordinators. As discussed above, continued threats to harm election officials hindered the IEC from recruiting enough people, in particular women, to staff all of their provincial offices and polling centers. This phenomenon was noticeably higher in higher- risk provinces, such as Kandahar and Paktika.[72]
Candidates also faced security concerns during the campaign season, and there were several security incidents reported. Incidents included attacks on presidential campaign offices, such as one attack reported in Ghor. Another attack targeted a provincial candidate in Jowzjan province who was killed by armed gunmen just days before the election.[73]
In the final weeks leading up to the election, the security posture in the country underwent a noticeable change as security forces stepped up their efforts to stem insurgent violence and secure major centers. On the streets of Kabul, ANP checkpoints were actively stopping and searching large numbers of vehicles. Despite its name, however, “Operation Ring of Steel” was proving far from impenetrable. On August 15, five days before the elections, at around 8:35 am, a large Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devise detonated near the vehicle entrance to ISAF Headquarters, not far from the U.S. Embassy, killing seven and wounding more than 90 people.[74]Indirect fire attacks were also stepped up as a means of intimidation with rockets and mortars targeting populated areas throughout the country.
During the days leading up to the elections, several convoys transporting election materials were attacked, including ones traveling to Kapisa and Ghazni. As polling centers began receiving their election materials a few days before the elections, the number of attacks jumped. In the few days leading up to the elections, polling centers were attacked in 13 provinces.[75]Other reported forms of violence to discourage people from voting included distribution of “night letters,” verbal threats, and rocket attacks.[76]
For the elections themselves, Democracy International deployed observers to 13 provinces. In total, DI directly observed 258 polling stations, including 95 female stations, across 71 polling centers throughout the provinces of Badghis, Helmand, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Kapisa, Nangarhar, Panjsher, Parwan, and Zabul. In three additional provinces—Paktika, Farah, and Ghazni—DI observers were able to conduct interviews but were not able to directly observe polling stations on election day due to security concerns.
The following sections provide DI’s general findings over the course of election day with respect to polling procedures, the conduct of election staff, the counting process, domestic observation, and the security situation. A province-by-province account of DI’s election day observations and some general observation statistics are provided in Appendix B.
DI observers reported that election officials were generally well prepared and polling stations were equipped with transparent ballot boxes, ballot papers, indelible ink, and other essential materials. In places DI observed, the layout of polling stations was generally effective and clearly communicated to voters and observers alike. PS staff members were generally available to assist voters, including the disabled and illiterate, and their assistance generally appeared impartial.
In some locations, observers reported that polling stations opened later than the planned opening time of 7:00 am. For instance, observers in Jalalabad who arrived at polling stations just before the scheduled opening witnessed widespread confusion and a lack of preparation on the part of IEC staff. The IEC failed to clearly and consistently report the number of polling stations that opened in each province.
There were other relatively minor administrative problems in many polling stations. Hole-punchers intended to mark voter cards often did not work, failing to puncture the laminate of the cards, and in cases we observed polling station staff used scissors to cut the corners of voter registration cards. There were also issues with the effectiveness of indelible ink; observers reported that in some cases indelible ink appeared diluted and easy to wash off.
Observers reported evidently underage boys being employed as PS staff, particularly in Kandahar. Observers also witnessed some apparently underage people trying to vote, although they were prevented from doing so. In other instances voters with ink on their fingers and punctured registration cards were allowed to cast additional ballots.
Observers reported a number of campaign-related violations, including the presence of campaign materials within 15 meters of stations, candidates or their agents campaigning directly outside of polling centers, and PS staff wearing campaign buttons. There were a few reports of PS staff seeming to favor particular candidates. In one province, provincial IEC staff members were deployed to fire PS staff on the spot.
The IEC decided at the last minute to extend the voting period by one hour nationwide. This decision was not well communicated and was largely counterproductive. Many observers reported that the time change raised suspicions of fraud among voters and candidate agents and contributed to unnecessary confusion just before the scheduled start of the counting process.
In a number of locations in several provinces, DI observed the presidential and provincial counts on election day and the following day. DI observers were also present at the National Tally Center in Kabul throughout the results tabulation process.
Despite confusion surrounding the extended time for polling, the counting process as we observed it generally proceeded smoothly on election day and the day following. Candidate agents and domestic observers were present at the counts.
Observers felt, however, that the IEC staff tended to be overly rigorous in rejecting ballots, with a general inclination to make technical judgments that ignored voter intent. There were also reports that ballots marked as spoiled were in fact unspoiled, with markings missed because of human error and observations of reconciliation discrepancies.
Although there seemed to be some confusion over which tally sheet to post outside of polling stations and which one to give to candidate agents, the results forms were generally posted in plain view just outside of polling stations.
DI observers did report the likelihood of stuffed ballot boxes in the south, particularly in Kandahar. Some local observers there reported that there seemed to be more ballots cast than there were eligible voters.
DI observers provided mixed reports on voter turnout. Generally, in the Northern provinces, turnout seemed to be strong, while in the South security concerns contributed to limited accessibility, particularly for women. DI observers in Kandahar and Helmand reported extremely low turnout. Most DI observers did support the belief shared by election officials, UNAMA, and other observer groups that turnout was significantly lower than expected.
Observers were encouraged by the youth turnout, however. Significant numbers of young Afghans turned out not just to cast ballots but also to assist in the administration of the election as PS staff.
Poor security and the placement of polling stations in culturally insensitive areas, such as government buildings, disproportionately affected the ability of women to cast ballots. Generally, there were inadequate numbers of female polling stations. In some female polling stations observed, staff members were not prepared for the volume of voters. The IEC was unable to recruit adequate numbers of female PC managers and PS staff, and there was a shortage of female security screeners throughout the country.
Despite these realities, DI observers in most locations reported large numbers of women voters showing up to cast ballots unaccompanied by men. There were also significant numbers of female domestic observers witnessed at polling stations.
Domestic observers were present on election day at most polling centers where there were DI observers. FEFA fielded the majority of observers. It reported 7,368 observers throughout the country, including 400 district-level long-term observers and 6,968 short-term observers. FEFA deployed observers to all 34 of Afghanistan’s provinces. FEFA also fielded observers at the National Tally Center in Kabul and at the Media Commission.[77]
Of the 400 district-level, long-term observers, 249 were female, and 2,454 of FEFA’s total observation force were women. Most of the domestic observers we saw were male, but DI observers did encounter female FEFA observers in Herat and Badghis provinces, among other places.
Generally, where DI was present, domestic observers maintained impartiality in their observation of the polling and counting process. Some meddling in the counting procedure, however, was reported in Jalalabad and Herat, where domestic observers pressured PS staff members to invalidate certain ballots. In some instances this resulted in a significant change in the results.
At the IEC press conference on election day, Minister of Defense Wardak proclaimed, “Afghans made history by taking part in the elections in a very challenging security environment” even though “the enemies of democracy did everything they could to discourage people from voting.”[78]Based on turnout estimates in some areas, however, this strategy appears to have worked. The government reported 135 incidents on election day, with 26 people killed including 17 from the ANSF. Many analysts believed the actual number to be much higher.[79]The Economist, for example, put the total number of incidents closer to 400, making it the most violent day in Afghanistan in the whole year.[80]
Although there were no spectacular or complex attacks, the Taliban’s strategy appears to have been one of intimidation, designed to deter rather than to actually kill voters. Based on reports of low turnout in many parts of the country, this tactic appears to have been successful. While it is difficult to distinguish between those Afghans who did not participate for security reasons and those who were simply disillusioned with the process or the government, it is fair to say that a combination of these two factors led to a disappointing turnout.
The majority of the polling stations that faced attacks on election day were in areas of the country most vulnerable to such actions, specifically in areas in the South and East and in problem districts in the North such as Kunduz. Apart from direct attacks on the polling centers, other incidents included wider-area RPG and mortar fire, which was more about voter intimidation than direct attacks on the election structures.[81]
Although most observer organizations applauded the apparent operational success of the electoral process on election day, Democracy International released a preliminary statement two days after the election emphasizing that it was still too early to tell if the process had been a successful step forward for Afghanistan’s democracy. Despite the fact that a large portion of polling centers opened and operated successfully and a significant number of Afghans had successfully cast ballots in an extremely challenging security environment, no winner had yet been declared. In our preliminary statement, we urged the IEC to provide partial results and to be fully transparent about their decisions and procedures. Withholding information could undermine the operational successes of election day and ultimately threaten the legitimacy of the entire process.
Unfortunately, in the weeks following the election it seemed that, rather than releasing results as they became available and fully explaining its processes, the IEC was managing the announcement of results. Preliminary results were tallied and released at a languid pace. Between the election on August 20 and the beginning of the runoff campaign on October 24, 27 days were spent tallying and announcing the preliminary results, and 34 days were spent auditing and reviewing the preliminary results. The delays in tallying and counting did not serve the process well. The delays raised suspicions that the government was improperly interfering in the process of announcing the results. Some in the Afghan press also charged that foreign interference in the election process was responsible for the delays.[82]
This apparently managed process undermined the IEC’s credibility and therefore the credibility of the entire election process. On September 6, the IEC determined that it would invalidate votes from 447 polling stations it had quarantined, only to reverse itself a day later on the grounds that it did not have the legal authority to invalidate votes.[83]Some in the press and international community viewed this decision as an effort by the IEC to bring Hamid Karzai’s vote total above 50 percent in the first round, regardless of whether quarantined or suspect ballots were included.[84]The IEC’s decision to reverse itself also coincided with the ECC’s decision (described below) to issue an audit and recount order for a substantial number of polling stations.
Because of the complexity of the tabulation and audit and the general lack of transparency, most stakeholders, including both leading political campaigns, judged these processes on the basis of their outcomes rather than their integrity. In other words, most stakeholders appeared concerned only about whether or not these processes would result in a runoff. This outcome-oriented approach substantially raised the risks that at least one competing political faction would not accept the results of the process.
From DI’s observations at the National Tally Center, the tabulation process was insufficiently transparent to ameliorate significant concerns about improper interference. DI observers were present regularly at the National Tally Center, where results in Tamper Evident Bags from the provinces were being received, opened, sorted, and entered into the national database through a standard double-blind entry process. Although a viewing area was established for observers and candidate agents, the process remained confusing and opaque. Tabulation center staff members were generally unhelpful in answering key questions regarding the tally process, such as whether ballot boxes had arrived from certain provinces or if a protocol was in place for tallying and announcing results. On one occasion, officials told DI observers that the IEC was prioritizing ballot boxes received from provinces with a small percentage of results reported, but this was never publically substantiated. The delays and changes throughout the nearly month-long process of tabulation raised concerns, particularly about the order in which districts and provinces were being processed.
During the tabulation process, some of the delays of announcements of the preliminary presidential election results were attributed to the need for the national tally center to simultaneously process results from the various provincial council elections. The IEC, however, did not announce provincial council election results for 30 provinces until 10 days after the preliminary, uncertified result for the presidential election and long after the national tally center had ceased operations. This claim that delays were a result of provincial council elections raised further concerns about the transparency of the results tabulation and reporting process.
The IEC began releasing preliminary results for the presidential election on August 25 and continued releasing results until September 16, when it released full preliminary results that did not include 646 IEC-quarantined polling stations. The preliminary uncertified results released on September 16 comprised 23,345 polling stations and 5,662,758 valid votes, of which Hamid Karzai won 3,093,256 votes (54.6 percent), 261,878 votes above the 50 percent threshold required for victory in the first round of the election. Abdullah Abdullah earned 1,571,581 valid votes (27.8 percent), finishing second.[85]
DI observers and analysts were present at each press conference where preliminary, uncertified results were released, and DI tracked and analyzed the results as they were made public. Based on this work, we believe that the apparent managed release of results likely contributed to perceptions of fraud in the first-round election. Areas in which Hamid Karzai was likely to perform well were not reported until late in the results-reporting process, and thus many in the international media and the opposing campaigns perceived the large increase in Karzai’s vote share in the last few days of results reporting as illegitimate. The lack of transparency in the results reporting process compounded perceptions of fraud.
Mounting concerns about electoral fraud prompted the ECC to order the IEC on September 8 “to conduct an audit and recount of ballot boxes in the presidential election in polling stations nationwide for which the preliminary results” met either (or both) of the following two criteria:
The intent of the ECC to investigate potential fraud in a systematic manner should be applauded. The ensuing audit process, however, was flawed. Throughout the process, the IEC and ECC issued multiple methodological and mathematical corrections. More important, no plan was developed for interpretation of the audit results, and the sampling procedure and statistical analysis suffered from significant methodological flaws.
Before issuing the audit order, the ECC issued a number of orders addressing specific Category 1 complaints (600 or more votes per polling station), which invalidated the results from entire polling stations and made the audit order appear to be a response to widespread fraud. At the time the ECC issued the order, eight days before the preliminary uncertified result was announced, the ECC did not know how many polling stations would meet either criterion or how many votes would need to be included in such an audit. Announcements about the number of polling stations that met the two criteria varied because the IEC committed several technical errors in the implementation of the order. Ultimately, 3,376 polling stations were identified that met the audit criteria, which together comprised roughly a quarter of all valid votes in the preliminary uncertified results.
When the full preliminary results were issued in mid-September, the ECC and IEC concluded that an “audit and recount” of the polling stations covered by the September 8 order could not be completed in a reasonable timeframe that would allow a runoff election, if one were to be required, to be held in 2009. Moreover, there were significant concerns about conducting audits in provincial centers as initially planned. After more than a week of negotiations among the IEC, ECC, and various diplomatic stakeholders, the IEC and ECC agreed to employ a sampling procedure to determine the findings of the ordered audit. The sample audit would examine 358 ballot boxes, which would be brought to an audit center in Kabul. No recount was planned or conducted. Two UN-appointed consultants developed the sampling procedure. Democracy International has not identified any precedent for using sampling to determine an election result in a developing country context.
At the time the sampling procedure was agreed upon, the IEC the ECC had no plan for interpreting the sample results and applying them to the overall set of polling stations covered by the audit. Despite having drawn a random sample of polling stations on September 24, the ECC did not decide on a formula for interpreting the findings until October 4, less than 24 hours before the opening of ballot boxes began in Kabul. The initial announcement of the formula was met with confusion regarding how exactly it would be interpreted mathematically, which led to a second announcement by the ECC outlining the mathematics of the procedure. This second announcement contained mathematical errors that subsequently were determined to make the initial formula inappropriate for the sampling method in question, and thus the formula was re-issued on October 11. This series of decisions and clarifications damaged both the credibility of the ECC and the audit process.
The population of suspicious polling stations was originally stratified into three categories based on the two aforementioned criteria for suspicion: (1) polling stations with 600 or more valid votes; (2) polling stations with 100 or more valid votes in which one candidate received 95 percent or more of the vote; and (3) polling stations in which both 600 or more valid votes were cast and one candidate received 95 percent of the total vote. A random sample of polling stations was drawn from each of the three categories. After the discovery that the sample had not been drawn correctly, apparently as a result of confusion regarding the translation of the order, a decision was made to include three additional categories to cover polling stations that had been unintentionally excluded.
Ultimately, six separate random samples were drawn, one for each category. Next, a “coefficient of fraud” was determined by dividing the number of invalidated votes in each sample category by the number of pre-audit valid votes in that category. Invalidation rates (or “coefficients of fraud”) ranged from 53 percent to 96 percent.
The invalidation rates were then applied to the votes of each candidate in the six strata, which came to be known as the “collective punishment” approach. The approach was best described to one DI observer as “using one stick to beat both the guilty and the innocent.”
Democracy International calculated that the total number of votes invalidated by the audit process was approximately 1.26 million votes, about 1 million of which were cast for Hamid Karzai.
The statistical approach employed in the sample audit process did not meet the basic requirements necessary to employ statistical sampling. For a sample-based audit process to produce a result that could instill confidence, the assumption of a normal distribution would need to hold true. There was no evidence to suggest the incidence of fraud was normally distributed across a population of polling stations in Afghanistan. Rather, where fraud exists, a normal distribution cannot be assumed. In short, sampling the entire population based on the assumption of the normal distribution of fraud is simply an invalid statistical approach.
Beyond the lack of foundational integrity, a number of other issues existed with the methodology employed for the sample audit.
First, units of analysis were inconsistent in the sampling and application of coefficients. The audit process investigated the likelihood of the incidence of fraud at the polling-station level, but claimed the ability to produce a coefficient that could be applied at the individual voter level to discount individual votes, not polling stations. By changing from one unit of analysis (polling stations) to another (votes), the process infers findings for a population that has in effect not been sampled or investigated at all.
Second, the ECC inaccurately asserted the Margins of Error (MoEs) for its calculations were close to half a percentage point. This assertion was incorrect because the audit process investigated the proportion of fraudulent ballot boxes in a sample, not the proportion of fraudulent votes. As such, the sample sizes were simply too small to produce such low MoEs and high levels of confidence.
The ECC also implied that based on these “low” MoEs, the application of its “collective punishment” coefficient (invalidating the votes of all candidates at the same percentage) was accurate within half a percentage point. Even if the ECC’s MoEs were accurate, they make no statement about the confidence of applying a coefficient to a population, only in the confidence that if another random sample was drawn, the same coefficient would be calculated.
Third, the stratification of the sample was fundamentally flawed. The inability of DI analysts to recreate the audit category samples, as well as the inclusion of three additional categories late in the audit process, call into question the stratification of the sample. Sample stratification should be based on homogeneous characteristics that are thought to have some varying effect on the question under investigation. Stratifying the sample by provinces, for example, would have merit on the basis that the incidence of fraud might have been more prevalent in some provinces than in others. Unfortunately, there is no statistically sound reason why type of suspicion – such as polling stations with 600 or more ballots or polling stations with greater than 95 percent votes cast for one candidate – can serve as a basis for sample stratification.
Fourth, one of the ECC’s guiding principles was logically inconsistent. As explained above, it was not possible to make judgments on individual votes given the audit procedures, only on ballot boxes at polling stations. The ECC’s audit process, therefore, imposed a double standard. The ECC invalidated entire polling stations based on the principle that where fraud existed the voting process was compromised at that location. But it abandoned this principle by applying a coefficient to a candidate’s vote total, in essence arguing that some votes can in fact be salvaged from compromised polling stations.
Last, the “collective punishment” approach contributed to the creation of a flawed incentive structure for the future. By invalidating the votes of all candidates by the same percentage, all those who tempted to commit fraud in future elections could take from this the following lesson: for every percentage point by which you fraudulently increase your candidate’s vote total, your competitors will be stripped of one percentage point of their votes, fraudulent or not. Although authorities will not allow the guilty party to keep its fraudulent votes, it will reward that party by taking votes away from its competitors.
While the audit process may have provided the means by which to reach a political solution regarding the next step in the election process, the audit was based on a series of flawed approaches.
Separate from the ECC audit process, the IEC decided on its own to withhold the results from certain suspicious polling stations, pending further review. In a press release on September 12, the IEC laid out three criteria for quarantining stations:
The IEC initially announced these criteria on September 16 to cover 579 stations, but that number was later increased to 646 stations. In early September, the IEC announced it would invalidate the quarantined polling stations, then believed to number 447. But the IEC then reversed its own decision a day later, concluding that it did not itself have the legal authority under the electoral law to invalidate results. The IEC then referred all quarantined stations to the ECC for a determination of their validity. After the ECC review of these stations, 18 were ruled acceptable, having no evidence of fraud. The ECC ruled that for 344 polling stations (not covered in other complaints) there was clear and convincing evidence of fraud. The ECC also ruled that no other polling stations from the quarantined stations could be included in the final results by the IEC without first applying audit and recount “coefficients of fraud,” if applicable. It is not clear that the IEC did in fact apply the “coefficients of fraud” to the remaining quarantined stations.
In total, the ECC received 2,854 election complaints on and after election day. Of these complaints, there were 604 complaints ruled to be “Priority A” complaints regarding the presidential election, meaning that the complaint could affect the vote outcome at one or more polling stations. The total number of polling stations covered in these Priority A complaints is not known, but the ECC decided to invalidate 210 polling stations on these grounds. Comparing the total number of votes invalidated by the ECC including the audit, the Priority A complaints process accounted for less than 5 percent of the total votes invalidated.
Many in Afghanistan sharply criticized the ECC process as being led by foreigners and used by the international community to influence the election process. These criticisms came to the fore when one of the ECC Commissioners, Mawlawi Mustafa Barakzai, briefly resigned from the ECC on October 12; he charged that the three international representatives on the ECC were “making all decisions on their own.”[87]President Karzai rejected Barakzai’s resignation on October 14 on the grounds that Barakzai needed to continue to serve “in the larger interest of the Afghan nation.”[88]It is not clear what formal authority Karzai had to reject Barakzai’s public resignation. A supreme court appointee, Barakzai never filed a formal written withdrawal, which prevented the supreme court from appointing a replacement. The episode, which occurred just days before the ECC’s announcement of its findings from the sample audit, further reinforced an image of the ECC as embattled and politicized.
Overall, the ECC process, including the audit, began as a challenging procedural, investigative, and legal endeavor. The Commission then compounded those difficulties by failing to clearly explain its work to the Afghan public. Even though the ECC faced enormous political pressure, it was responsible for its own decision-making, particularly regarding the audit and sampling procedure, and thus bears responsibility for the flawed process.
After the ECC issued its decisions publicly on October 19, the IEC faced the question of how to interpret the ECC’s rulings. Some, including the ECC, believed that the interpretation of the decisions was clear-cut: the IEC should implement the announced formulas and announce a result accordingly.
On October 19, DI issued a public statement explaining the significance of the ECC’s decisions. Under Afghanistan’s electoral law, these decisions were binding. As the DI press release explained, after applying the ECC’s decisions to the preliminary results, Hamid Karzai’s percentage of the vote fell below the 50 percent threshold needed to avoid a second-round runoff election. (See Table 2.) As a result, a runoff between Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah was necessary under the law.
|
Table 2: Interpretation of ECC Audit Findings |
|||||
|
Candidate |
Uncertified Valid Votes |
Invalidated Votes from Audit |
Invalidated Votes from Category A Complaints |
New Valid Vote |
Percentage of Vote |
|
Hamid Karzai |
3,093,256 |
954,526 |
41,276 |
2,097,454 |
48.29% |
|
Abdullah Abdullah |
1,571,581 |
191,554 |
10,098 |
1,369,929 |
31.54% |
|
Others |
997,921 |
115,322 |
6,540 |
876,059 |
20.17% |
|
Total |
5,662,758 |
1,261,403 |
57,914 |
4,343,441 |
100.00% |
|
Notes: DI's calculations were based on publically available data from the IEC and ECC |
|
||||
The IEC argued that it had the right to reject the ECC’s findings in the case of the audit because the audit fell outside the scope of the regular ECC complaints process. Only a small fraction of the polling stations in the audit had a separate Priority A complaint against them. Supporters of Hamid Karzai also applied political pressure in an attempt to force the IEC to reject some or all of the ECC’s findings regarding the audit.
After much well-publicized political wrangling, the IEC accepted the ECC’s decisions and announced that they had been implemented, resulting in Hamid Karzai’s vote share being reduced to 49.67 percent. Two days later, the IEC revealed that Abdullah Abdullah had received 30.59 percent of the remaining post-audit valid vote. It is still unclear exactly how the IEC calculated the final certified results, which were inconsistent with DI’s calculations from publicly available numbers. DI requested, but never received, clarification on the calculations used by the IEC.
Official campaigning for the runoff began on October 24 and was scheduled to end on November 5. Campaigning was almost entirely process-oriented, with little public debate about any substantive policy issues. Neither candidate held major rallies with their supporters or made major trips to the provinces. The central public arguments in the aborted runoff campaign concerned whether any IEC Commissioners, most notably IEC President Azizullah Ludin, would be replaced before the runoff election.
At the outset of the runoff process, Abdullah’s campaign issued 17 written demands it considered necessary to ensure that the second round of voting would be conducted fairly. Abdullah’s conditions called mostly for a wide range of officials to be replaced, including three cabinet ministers. President Karzai, who appointed the IEC Commissioners and cabinet ministers, refused to make any changes to either body before the second round of voting. The electoral law and the Afghan constitution were ambiguous as to whether the president had the formal legal power to remove the IEC chairperson. Nevertheless, Karzai would have very likely had the political capacity to force a resignation if he had wanted to do so. The IEC did make some minor changes to its provincial and district election staff, most notably by not re-hiring six provincial election officers and rotating eight more to new provinces.
Abdullah subsequently issued an ultimatum that his demands for personnel changes be met by October 31 or he would withdraw from the race. On November 1, after none of the major personnel changes that he had called for had been made, Abdullah announced in a speech at the Loya Jirga tent in Kabul that he “would not participate” in the runoff election.[89]
Under international pressure, the IEC began preparations for the runoff in mid-September, well before the runoff was formally announced in mid-October. By mid-September, polling kits were already in the provincial centers. The two remaining items – indelible ink, which has a limited shelf life, and ballots, which could not be printed until there was a formal determination on the results – were produced and shipped in early October, arriving in Kabul a week before the runoff was announced by the IEC. As a result, the major challenges in preparing for the runoff were determining which polling centers would open and whether certain election officials would be remain in place.
The IEC released a new manual of procedures for the runoff election. As a result of the truncated timeline for the runoff, the IEC did not conduct a comprehensive, on-the-ground civic education campaign. Instead, it relied on public service announcements using print, broadcast television, and radio media. The IEC also made a number of other procedural changes, including reducing the size of the polling station staff from five to three and introducing the use of a star shaped hole punch for voter registration cards. (In the first round, circular shaped hole punches failed to penetrate the lamination of voter registration cards.)
In late October, the IEC announced it would attempt to open 6,322 polling centers on the runoff election day, more than were open on August 20, but slightly less than 17,000 polling stations, which was approximately 6,000 fewer stations than were open in the first round. This decision came despite the UN’s recommendation that that the number of polling centers be reduced to 5,817, and it raised concerns that the runoff process would be no fairer than the first round.[90]Nonetheless, the IEC argued that Afghan and international security forces would be able to secure the increased number of polling centers across the country.
An analysis of the locations of the polling centers also raised concerns about the quality of a runoff election. For example, Paktika, a province that was widely recognized to have significant problems with the quality of its first-round vote, was scheduled to have more than 160 additional polling stations than were reported in the preliminary uncertified results from September 16. Within some provinces there appeared to be evidence of a shift toward a higher density of polling stations outside of major cities. In Kandahar, for example, the province planned less than 100 fewer polling stations than were reported in the uncertified pre-audit results, but Kandahar City had almost 250 new polling stations planned; this meant there were nearly 150 more stations planned outside of Kandahar City than were reported in the preliminary uncertified result. The unexpected increase in the number of polling centers in rural areas in provinces that had proved to be problematic in the first round raised concerns.
On November 2, after Abdullah’s withdrawal from the race, the IEC declared the runoff election cancelled and Hamid Karzai elected as president of Afghanistan. The IEC announced that the runoff election was cancelled because only the two leading candidates from the first round could participate and one of those two candidates had announced his nonparticipation.[91]The legal and procedural basis for this conclusion was debatable, since Abdullah had not filed any formal written withdrawal notice with the IEC, as this had been the procedure for withdrawal of a presidential candidate in the first round. Although the practical value of holding the runoff election with only one candidate participating would have been questionable, the Afghan constitution and the electoral law were ambiguous about whether the IEC had the authority to cancel the runoff.
The IEC released the first results for the provincial council elections, which took place concurrent with the presidential elections on August 20, only on September 26. The preliminary results covered 30 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces; they did not include Ghazni, Kandahar, Nangarhar, or Paktika. Throughout November and December, the IEC released final certified provincial council results province by province. By December 26, the IEC had released final certified results for all provinces, with Kandahar, Herat, and Takhar the last provinces to have final results released.
To determine whether there were unusual patterns in the provincial council results, DI conducted a province-by-province assessment of the preliminary results, which highlighted some potential concerns. Suspicious patterns – where multiples of 10, 50, and 100 valid votes – were present in the results. Although far from conclusive, these patterns may have indicated collusion among candidates. The results of this analysis are listed in Table 3.
These tests provided only rough indications of possible fraud, however. The analysis identified polling stations that were the most likely to contain suspicious results. Several other criteria could potentially indicate fraud—such as polling stations with more than 540 total votes and ones with more than 90 percent of votes cast for one candidate—that could suggest more questionable results in each province. Because of the significant problems with the polling-station-level results for the presidential election, DI did not compare the provincial council results with polling station results from the presidential election. Although not a definitive indication of fraud, some of the reported results differed so significantly from what would normally be observed that they raise serious questions about the validity of the provincial council results.
|
Table 3: Review of Preliminary Provincial Council Results |
|||||
|
Province |
PS Reporting > 1 Valid Vote |
% PS Reporting a Multiple of 10 |
% PS Reporting a Multiple of 50 |
% PS Reporting a Multiple of 100 |
|
|
Badakhshan |
920 |
10.54% |
1.96% |
1.30% |
|
|
Badghis |
371 |
12.40% |
4.58% |
3.77% |
|
|
Baghlan |
663 |
10.86% |
3.02% |
1.06% |
|
|
Balkh |
1330 |
8.12% |
1.35% |
0.68% |
|
|
Bamyan |
403 |
12.16% |
2.23% |
1.74% |
|
|
Daikondi |
554 |
9.57% |
2.53% |
1.08% |
|
|
Farah |
360 |
14.44% |
4.72% |
4.17% |
|
|
Faryab |
837 |
11.11% |
2.63% |
1.67% |
|
|
Ghazni |
866 |
25.06% |
16.40% |
13.51% |
|
|
Ghor |
796 |
11.18% |
3.39% |
2.89% |
|
|
Helmand |
455 |
24.18% |
16.04% |
14.95% |
|
|
Herat |
1722 |
11.50% |
2.26% |
1.34% |
|
|
Juzjan |
510 |
9.41% |
2.35% |
0.78% |
|
|
Kabul |
2524 |
9.83% |
2.14% |
0.91% |
|
|
Kandahar |
864 |
22.57% |
15.63% |
14.81% |
|
|
Kapisa |
319 |
13.17% |
2.82% |
2.51% |
|
|
Khost |
353 |
28.33% |
20.11% |
19.83% |
|
|
Kunarha |
495 |
13.54% |
4.24% |
2.63% |
|
|
Kunduz |
579 |
10.71% |
1.90% |
0.69% |
|
|
Laghman |
495 |
10.91% |
4.04% |
2.42% |
|
|
Logar |
304 |
11.18% |
2.96% |
2.30% |
|
|
Nangerhar |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
|
|
Nimroz |
162 |
12.35% |
4.32% |
3.09% |
|
|
Nooristan |
120 |
54.17% |
48.33% |
47.50% |
|
|
Paktia |
616 |
24.51% |
18.67% |
18.02% |
|
|
Paktika |
411 |
59.37% |
48.91% |
44.77% |
|
|
Panjshir |
310 |
9.35% |
1.94% |
0.97% |
|
|
Parwan |
519 |
11.75% |
2.70% |
1.54% |
|
|
Samangan |
367 |
9.54% |
2.45% |
0.82% |
|
|
Sar-i-Pul |
454 |
7.71% |
1.76% |
0.88% |
|
|
Takhar |
936 |
9.51% |
1.60% |
0.64% |
|
|
Urozgan |
212 |
9.43% |
2.83% |
0.94% |
|
|
Wardak |
232 |
18.10% |
11.64% |
9.91% |
|
|
Zabul |
159 |
11.32% |
2.52% |
1.26% |
|
|
Source: Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan |
|||||
|
Notes: PS reporting a multiple of 10 expected by slightly less than ten percent, those reporting a multiple of 50 slightly less than 2 percent, and those reporting a multiple of 100 slightly less than 1 percent. |
|||||
For the provincial council elections, approximately 630 Priority A complaints were filed with the ECC.[92]The ECC delayed responding to all provincial council complaints until it completed its work on the presidential election on October 18. Analyzing the provincial council results for fraud and taking appropriate corrective action was much more difficult with the provincial council results than for the presidential results because the margins between the candidates were much smaller. As a result, the elimination of even a single station could indeed affect the results of a particular race.
DI analyzed a sample of provinces to assess the ECC review process. This limited analysis indicated that there was not necessarily a strong correlation between suspicious patterns of vote totals in the uncertified results from the IEC and the number of votes invalidated by the ECC. Consistent with its mandate, the ECC appears to have invalidated results in the provincial council elections primarily in response to complaints that presented verifiable evidence. As a result, invalidations appeared to be much more common for reasonably accessible provinces close to Kabul (such as Panjshir and Kapisa), while those provinces that were less accessible (Helmand and Farah) had far fewer ECC-invalidated votes than one might expect based on the vote patterns. These results are displayed in Table 4.
|
Table 4. Effect of ECC Decisions on Provincial Council Election |
||||
|
Province |
Total Valid Votes |
Votes Invalidated by ECC |
% Change |
Changed Outcomes |
|
Farah |
89,253 |
-1,081 |
-1.20% |
0 |
|
Helmand |
123,842 |
-2,699 |
-2.20% |
0 |
|
Kapisa |
61,600 |
-6,044 |
-10.90% |
1 |
|
Panjshir |
38,895 |
-3,318 |
-9.30% |
1 |
|
Sar-i-Pul |
119,805 |
-163 |
-0.10% |
0 |
|
Urozgan |
28,326 |
0 |
0.00% |
0 |
|
Zabul |
14,997 |
0 |
0.00% |
0 |
|
Notes: Calculated by DI using IEC and ECC data |
|
|
||
The ECC faced serious methodological challenges identifying and developing sufficient evidence of suspicious voting patterns in provincial council elections. It also faced real financial constraints, which limited its ability to conduct comprehensive investigations in all provinces. While a broad review of the provincial council elections, as occurred for the presidential elections, would not necessarily have been practical, with additional resources and more time the ECC could have perhaps more effectively scrutinized the provincial council results.
Afghanistan’s 2009 elections revealed numerous flaws both in the country’s election system and in the administrative processes that support it.
The Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy released in January 2010 by the U.S. Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan highlights the importance of supporting Afghan efforts to reform the electoral system. This document put forward two milestones for success: (1) “political agreement on the way forward for elections scheduled for 2010 and beyond,” and (2) “implementation of agreed reforms to elections and related laws.”[93]
Relevant stakeholders should pursue both a short-term tactical and a long-term strategic approach toward strengthening Afghanistan’s ability to hold credible and acceptable elections. With legislative elections scheduled for September 2010, concrete steps can be taken in the short term that will improve the quality of the election process. At the same time, however, larger reforms that cannot be enacted before an election in 2010 remain crucial for the long-term strengthening of Afghanistan’s democratic system.
Based on its extensive observation of the election process, and as articulated in the findings and analysis of this report, DI urges the government of Afghanistan and the international community to consider the following recommendations for needed reforms.
Maintain the impartiality of the IEC. The perceived partiality of the IEC in 2009 was one major contributing factor to the ultimate failure of the electoral process to win the confidence of the people of Afghanistan and the international community. If the IEC continues to be perceived as biased, the people of Afghanistan may forever question the legitimacy of their election commission and the efficacy of elections as a means of choosing leadership. The IEC must avoid even the appearance of partiality and should make every effort to instill confidence in candidates, voters, and international stakeholders that the IEC is in fact the independent institution Afghanistan needs to run successful elections. If the IEC becomes tainted through its own actions, the government of Afghanistan should act to ensure that impartiality is restored.
Establish swift and effective methods for prosecuting electoral fraud. The government of Afghanistan should grant an appropriate government body the jurisdiction to swiftly prosecute and punish those implicated in electoral fraud. While the ECC played a vital role in providing an avenue for complaints to be heard and investigated, no existing institution appears to have both the authority and the political will to prosecute individuals guilty of electoral offenses with the speed necessary to create incentives that could deter the fraud committed in 2009.
Eliminate the entry points of fraud. The IEC should examine possible entry points for fraud and develop systems by which to mitigate the risk. Specific examples of entry points for fraud include the distribution of sensitive election materials, the certification of tally sheets, and the counting and tallying processes. By identifying these vulnerabilities, Afghan and international actors can focus their efforts on deterring the fraud that occurred in 2009.
The prevention of widespread fraud cannot and should not depend on the honesty and integrity of each and every election official. Although all effort should be taken to recruit and train an election workforce of the highest integrity, it is even more important that systems that provide avenues for corruption should be reformed. Checks and balances must be better distributed throughout the process of administering elections so that one corrupt district field coordinator is not be able to undermine the entire election in his or her district.
Abandon the use of sample-based audits. Sample-based audits should not be used to correct for fraud. Random sampling should be used to determine whether the incidence of fraud was widespread enough to warrant further concern, not to make calculations about the extent of fraud within potentially fraudulent polling stations. Using random sampling to invalidated election results is both unprecedented and fundamentally flawed.
The specific methodology used in the 2009 sample audit applied the same invalidation rates to all candidates. If adopted as a response to potential fraud in the future, this method could actually create incentives for fraud. The approach also sets a precedent for simplistic expediency rather than thorough investigation; instead of pursuing fraud diligently and comprehensively, it employs a shortcut that compromises the basic democratic principle of counting every vote.
Increase transparency of election administration and improve coordination between relevant election stakeholders. Throughout the 2009 election process the individuals and organizations collectively responsible for the success of the election effort too often came to operate as competing rivals rather than as complementary actors. The lack of transparency, effective communication, and coordination among election stakeholders contributed to an environment of uncertainty and mistrust. Better communication and coordination among electoral authorities, implementers, and international assistance organizations would help strengthen the administration and integrity of the election process by creating an environment of collective oversight that did not exist in 2009.
Develop and present for comment a plan for the tracking and distribution of sensitive elections materials. The IEC should develop a clear and comprehensive plan for the distribution of sensitive elections materials that includes a clear strategy for tracking the transit of materials to and from Kabul. The IEC should maintain a temporary operations room with the specific task of overseeing the distribution of sensitive election materials. Election authorities should brief international and domestic observers before and at the conclusion of major operations for the transport of sensitive election materials.
Establish effective coordination between the IEC and civil society. The IEC and Afghanistan’s civil society organizations should work together to support the election process. Civil society organizations should mobilize their networks to help fill the gaps in the IEC’s staffing capacity. The Afghan Women’s Network, for example, could provide female security screeners at polling stations throughout the country. Such partnerships would help fill critical needs and also strengthen civil society’s confidence in the IEC by establishing CSOs as true stakeholders in the election process. The international community should provide funding for such partnerships.
Strengthen the procedures at the national tally center. The IEC should revisit the design of and procedural rules employed at the national tally center in Kabul. Safeguards in the data entry process should be strengthened. Specifically, the IEC should erect walls between the three data-entry stations and ensure no communication takes place between line managers. The IEC staff should be better trained for communicating the intake and tallying procedures to observers and other stakeholders and explaining specific problems with visibly quarantined ballot boxes.
Replace the SNTV system.The use of the SNTV electoral system stifles the emergence and growth of political parties, limits fair representation for the Afghan people, and provides greater incentives for fraud and intimidation on election day. The international community should support Afghan civil society groups and political actors in their study of alternative systems to SNTV and encourage the Afghan government to change the election system for future legislative and provincial council elections.
Increase assistance to domestic observation groups. As with most fledgling CSOs in Afghanistan, the Free and Fair Elections Foundation of Afghanistan needs to strengthen its capacity. It would benefit from the incorporation of long-term capacity-building and technical assistance into its core plan, particularly when it comes to analyzing data gathered by its observers.
FEFA must also work on identifying potential CSOs for its coalition in all of the provinces so it can coordinate and train these local CSOs well in advance of elections. These CSOs in turn can identify appropriate observers that can receive more in-depth training on the observer process before the election process. Observer reporting forms should also be simplified.
The international community should increase funding and technical assistance to domestic observation groups and ensure that this support extends beyond a specific election cycle. Although FEFA provided a much-needed domestic observation of the 2009 elections, increased assistance should be provided to help support the development of additional domestic observation capabilities or new organizations. Domestic election monitoring can help build a culture of accountability in the administration of elections and can provide broader election-day coverage than can international election observation missions. Support should be provided between election cycles to ensure the continuity and professionalization of observation groups.
Consider providing election assistance through multiple implementers. The international community should explore whether election assistance can be provided through multiple coordinated efforts, rather than through one implementer, as was largely the case for the 2009 elections. Support to domestic election observation groups should no longer be administered through UNDP-Elect, the organization primarily responsible for providing technical assistance to the election commission. This creates a conflict of interest and places an additional burden on UNDP’s administrative, management, and technical capabilities. By decentralizing assistance, the international community would also increase the likelihood that problems would be detected earlier and should make implementers more accountable.
Reform the selection process for IEC and ECC commissioners. The new leadership of Afghanistan’s electoral authorities has already been appointed for 2010. This should not, however, prohibit long-term reform of the selection process from taking place. President Karzai has an opportunity to show the Afghan people and the international community that he is serious about strengthening his country’s democracy by supporting the parliamentary approval of IEC and ECC appointments.
Create a civil and voter registry. Significant improvements to the voter-registration system cannot be made before parliamentary elections and should not be pursued in that timeframe. The goal of developing a civil registry, however, should not be abandoned. The London Conference on Afghanistan of 2006 culminated in the Afghan Compact, which recommended the creation of a civil and voter registry by the end of 2009. Although this deadline was not met, the government of Afghanistan and the international community should refocus on this goal after the next round of elections.
Re-evaluate electoral capacity-building strategy. The October 2009 quarterly report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) highlights the need for a long-term strategy on building and sustaining Afghan electoral capacity.[94]An additional SIGAR audit report recommended that UNDP hire a capacity-development advisor who would be tasked with implementing a strategic plan for the transfer of skills and knowledge to Afghan election officials.[95]The international community must move forward with developing a long-term, sustainable capacity-building strategy for the IEC to contribute to the consistent administration of credible and acceptable elections in Afghanistan. A first step toward this goal would be to implement the SIGAR’s recommendations as soon as possible.
In addition to the recommendations listed above, DI has compiled and synthesized consensus recommendations from a wide range of Afghan civil society organizations, international observer missions, assistance organizations, and independent election experts.DI drew these recommendations from a comprehensive analysis of 437 recommendations presented by this broad group of stakeholders in Afghanistan’s election process. DI has compiled and made public all of these recommendations in a separate document titled “Recommendations for Electoral Reform in Afghanistan,” which is available for download at www.democracyinternational.com [1].
From this analysis, Democracy International has identified the following 34 recommendations, which reflect the opinions of a wide range of stakeholders, as the points of major consensus for electoral reform in Afghanistan. DI did not developed these recommendations independently but rather synthesized them from more than 50 source documents. These recommendations should form the basis for an all inclusive discussion of comprehensive electoral reform in Afghanistan.
The key consensus recommendations for electoral reform in Afghanistan are as follows:
The deficiencies in the Afghan political system transcend elections and include a number of institutional problems that impede democratic development in the country. Free and fair elections are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the development of a robust democratic system. In the absence of political institutions that are truly representative and in the face of independent centers of authority that are not accountable to Afghan citizens, free and fair elections do not amount to a solution on their own. These persistent issues include a fragile security environment, obstacles to women’s participation in the political process, executive influence on the judiciary and other institutions, a flawed voter registration system, and an underdeveloped political party system that leads to the election of candidates who do not truly represent their constituents. Until these and other issues are resolved, Afghanistan cannot develop into a genuinely democratic state.
In addition to these concerns, Afghanistan’s leadership has not demonstrated the political will to implement true electoral reform, especially given the context of widespread security issues and economic instability. Electoral reform is, however, inextricably linked to these security and economic problems. It is an integral aspect of the overall political reform and development needed to strengthen the Afghan institutions necessary to address the widening economic and security crises.
Recent developments have not been encouraging. The willingness of President Karzai and his cabinet to reform the electoral system through decree, with little to no consultation with the wide range of Afghan electoral stakeholders, was troubling. Recent reports that government officials throughout Afghanistan have begun to threaten and intimidate civil society advocates are equally disturbing. Those Afghans who struggle in their effort to strengthen Afghanistan’s democratic system should not be dismayed, however. The fate of the Afghan democracy depends on the strength of their resolve.
Resolving Afghanistan’s electoral problems, of course, will not by itself be enough to create a sustainable democratic political system. The ongoing war in Afghanistan underscores the fact that the country faces a broader set of governance challenges, including state building, rule-of-law reform, civic education, and the security environment, which must be overcome for democracy to develop in Afghanistan.
Fairer elections can help to alleviate these problems, however. But without further electoral and institutional reforms, Afghanistan will continue to face challenges in building a political system that is rooted in democracy and a government that is accountable to and can effectively provide for its people.
[1]Eric Bjornlund, Glenn Cowan, and William Gallery, “Election Systems and Political Parties in Post-Conflict and Fragile States.” Rebuilding Governance in Post-Conflict Societies and Fragile States: Emerging Perspectives, Actors, and Approaches, edited byDerick W. Brinkerhoff, (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 65.
[2]Martin Ewans, Afghanistan, A Short History of Its People and Politics, p.7, Perennial Press, 2002
[3]Ali Wardak, Jirga- A Traditional Mechanism of Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan, University of Glamorgan, UK
[4]Presidential Decree 38, 30/2/1388 (May 20, 2009)
[5]International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan’s Election Challenges”, June 24, 2009 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6176&l=1 [2]
[6]The Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) originally had nine commissioners and was reduced to seven under the IEC.
[7]Electoral Law, Chapter II, Article 8
[8]The sorting process for provincial council ballots was also slightly different in these four areas. IEC Polling and Counting Procedures Summary.
[9]Electoral Law, Chapter V, Article 18
[10]Unless otherwise noted, the information in this section on logistics and polling staff is from the August 3 logistics update by the IEC.
[11]Figure on sample ballots is from http://afghanelections.org/pdf/2009%20Weekly%20Report%20No27.%2028%20July-3%20August%202009.pdf [3].
[12]Articles 62 of the Constitution and 14, 15 of the Electoral Law
[13]Article 4.1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Electoral Complaints Commission
[14]Article 4.3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Electoral Complaints Commission
[15]Article 4.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Electoral Complaints Commission
[16]Articles 9.1 and 9.4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Electoral Complaints Commission
[17]2009 Voter Registration Observation Report, FEFA, p.24
[18]2009 Voter Registration Observation Report, FEFA, p. 36-38
[19]2009 Voter Registration Observation Report, FEFA, p.41
[20]United Nations DSS SIOC Daily Security Reports, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2009
[21]2009 Voter Registration Observation Report, FEFA, p. 43
[22]2009 Voter Registration Observation Report, FEFA, p.44
[23]ECC Press Release, June 9, 2009
[24]ECC Press Release, June 9, 2009
[25]ECC Rules of Procedure, article 7.2a
[26]ECC Press Release, June 9, 2009
[27]ECC Press Release, June 9, 2009
[28]IEC Press Release, June 13, 2009
[29]ECC Press Release, August 18, 2009
[30]“Decree of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on Noninterference in the Electoral Affairs of Elections 1388 (2009).” http://www.iec.org.af/assets/PDF/decree/english/presidential_decree_non-interference_in_election_process.pdf [4]
[31]Interview with Commissioner Mohammed Farid Hamidi, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), July 27, 2009.
[32]Interview with Shahrzad Akbar, Free & Fair Elections Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA), July 27, 2009 and http://www.fefa.org.af/download/Campaign_Report%20For%20Website.pdf [5].
[34]DI observer Leslie Knott interview with Sidiqullah Tawhidi, August 15, 2009.
[35]U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2009 Human Rights Report: Afghanistan.
[36]OSCE “Election Support Team to Afghanistan Recommendations on Elections 2005,” October 6, 2005, www.osce.org/item/html [7]
[37]“Towards a Successful 2009 Afghanistan Presidential Election,” Workshop report, by Bob Sharp, December 9, 2009.
[38]Jan Malekzade, UNAMA, Interview by Adam Sugar and Tim Fairbank, 6 August 2009, Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
[39]Naim Nazari, Civil Society & Human Rights Network (CSHRN), Interview by Tim Fairbank, Laurie Knop, and Chris Jackson, 26 July 2009, Kabul, Afghanistan.
[40]Mr. Shaharzad Akbar, FEFA, Interview with Adam Sugar and Tim Fairbank, July 26, 2009, Kabul, Afghanistan.
[41]www.fefa.org.af/pressrelease [8], Election Day Press Statement, August 20, 2009.
[42]Mr. Jandad Spinghar, Executive Director FEFA, Interview with Adam Sugar, August 30, 2009, Kabul, Afghanistan.
[43]Sarwar Hussaini, Executive Director CCA, DI Interview with Tim Fairbank and Laurie Knop, July 28, 2009, Kabul, Afghanistan.
[44]Naim Nazari, Executive Director CSHRN, DI interview with Tim Fairbank, Laurie Knop, and Chris Jackson, July 27, 2009, Kabul, Afghanistan.
[45]Fahim Sadiq, Director ANPO, DI Interview with Laurie Knop and Tim Fairbank, July 30, 2009, Kabul, Afghanistan.
[46]Afghanistan Civil Society Assessment; How Afghans View Civil Society,” by Anika Ayrapetyants, Counterpart International, 2006.
[47]Afghanistan Civil Society Assessment: How Afghans View Civil Society,” by Counterpart International (I-PACS), 2006, Afghanistan.
[48]“Advocacy & Networking: Five Million Women Campaign, www.afghanwomensnetwork.org/advocacy [9].
[49]Nilab Mobarez, “Provincial Council Election,” United Nations Mission to Afghanistan, May 7, 2009.
[50]Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009 - Afghanistan, July 16, 2009, available at: http://w [10]ww.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a6452d71c.html.
[51]United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), “UNIFEM Afghanistan Fact Sheet 2007,” www.afghanistan.unifem.org/docs/pubs/07/factsheet.html [11]. In addition, in 2004, 87 percent of Afghans believed that women need a male relative's authorization to vote; 35 percent of women believed [they would not have permission/ be eligible] to vote; and 18 percent of men admitted they would not allow their wives to vote.
[52]“Afghanistan’s Election Challenges, Asia Report No. 171, June 24, 2009, International Crisis Group
[53]Nilab Mobarez, “Provincial Council Election,” United Nations Mission to Afghanistan, May 7, 2009.
[54]Najla Ayubi, DI Interview by Laurie Knop, Tim Fairbank, and Chris Jackson, July 27, 2009, The Asia Foundation, Kabul, Afghanistan.
[55]“Afghan Women Candidates Campaign in Burqas,” July 30, 2009 by Rukmini Callimachi, Shirak Pirak, Associated Press.
[56]Female FEFA representative, DI Interview by Laurie Knop and David Aasen, August, 2009, Parwan, Afghanistan.
[57]Vic Getz, IFES, DI Interview by Laurie Knop, August 25, 2009, Kabul, Afghanistan.
[58]Najla Ayubi, Interview by Laurie Knop, Tim Fairbank, and Chris Jackson, July 27, 2009, The Asia Foundation, Kabul, Afghanistan.
[59]Marina Nawabi and Vic Getz, “Barriers and Opportunities for Women’s Participation in the Election Process in Afghanistan,” May 13, 2009, IFES, www.ifes.org/features [12].
[60]Najla Ayubi, DI Interview by Laurie Knop, Tim Fairbank, and Chris Jackson, July 27, 2009, The Asia Foundation, Kabul, Afghanistan.
[61]Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007, Center for Policy and Human Development, p. 164.
[62]“FEFA’s report on Voter Registration, Third Phase, p.3, www.fefa.org.af/eng_pages/reports/VRP_Rep/VRP_3.pdf [13].
[63]International Crisis Group, Asia Report No 171, Afghanistan’s Election Challenges. June 24, 2009, p.1.
[64]Project Athena, Trend Overview. April – June 2009.
[65]“The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security” , UN document A/63/751-S/2009/135, March 10, 2009, p.5.
[66]IEC Stakeholders Meeting, Zekria Barakzai. August 30, 2009.
[67]www.walesonline.co.uk/.../brown-hails-success-of-panther-s-claw-in- [14]afghanistan-91466-24254530/
[68]UNDSS SIOC Daily Security Report. August 1, 2009
[69]“Progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan” Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, US Department of Defense, January 2009, p.9. In April 2007 the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board (JCMB) agreed to a temporary increase to 82,000 from 62,000. Interview with UNDP Elect Security, August 10, 2009.
[70]WSJ. Afghanistan Enlists Tribal Militia Forces, August 12, 2009. www.online.wsj.com/article/SB124994313594220571.html [15]
[71]USIP Special Report 227, “Afghanistan’s Police – The weak link in Security Sector Reform” August 2009.
[72]United Nations DSS SIOC Daily Security Reports, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2009.
[73]United Nations DSS SIOC Daily Security Reports, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2009.
[74]Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), Warden Message: Kabul Suicide Bombing, August 15, 2009. www.osac.gov [16]
[75]These provinces were Badghis, Balkh, Faryab, Helmand, Jowzjan, Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, Logar, Laghman, Nangahar, Paktya, and Wardak. United Nations DSS SIOC Daily Security Reports, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2009, United Nations DSS SIOC Daily Security Reports, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2009.
[76]United Nations DSS SIOC Daily Security Reports, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2009.
[77]2009 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections: Final Observation Report. Free and Fair Elections Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA). January, 2009.
[78]IEC Press Conference, Minister Wardak (Minister of Defense), August 20, 2009. [(6.30pm)]
[79]IEC Press Conference, Official Incident Data. August 20, 2009. (6.30pm)
[80]The Economist, Afghanistan’s presidential elections, “More votes than voters” Kabul. August 27, 2009.
[81]United Nations DSS SIOC Daily Security Reports, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2009.
[82]“What does it mean to postpone announcement of election results?” Anis, September 15, 2009
[83]Farmer, Ben, “Suspect votes cancelled in Afghan poll,” The Daily Telegraph, September 7, 2009
[84]Rosenberg, Matthew and Anand Gopal, “Count favors Karzai, includes suspect votes,” Wall Street Journal, September 9, 2009
[85]“IEC - Presidential & Provincial Council Elections - Afghanistan 2009 Elections - Final uncertified results released September 16, 2009 2PM,” available previously at: http://www.iec.org.af/results/leadingCandidate.html [17], accessed on September 16, 2009.
[86] http://www.ecc.org.af/en/images/stories/pdf/ECC%20ORDER%202009-9-8%20en%20dr%20_%20Final.pdf [18]
[87]Reid, Robert and Heidi Vogt, “Problems beset Afghan vote recount,” Associated Press, October 12, 2009
[88]“Karzai Rejects Barakzai Resignation,” Pajhwok, October 14, 2009, available at: http://www.pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=83084 [19]
[89]Constable, Pamela, “Status of Afghan runoff unclear as Karzai’s chief rival withdraws,” Washington Post, November 2, 2009, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/01/AR2009110100605.html [20]
[90]Vogt, Heidi, “Fraud surrounds women voters in Afghan election,” Associated Press, October 31, 2009
[92] Email communication with ECC official, November 3, 2009
[93] “Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy”. Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. January 2010, p. 10.
[94]Quarterly Report to the United States Congress of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. October 30, 2009.
[95]“Strategy and Resources Needed to Sustain Afghan Electoral Capacity”. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. September 22, 2009.
Links:
[1] http://www.democracyinternational.com
[2] http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6176&l=1
[3] http://afghanelections.org/pdf/2009%20Weekly%20Report%20No27.%2028%20July-3%20August%202009.pdf
[4] http://www.iec.org.af/assets/PDF/decree/english/presidential_decree_non-interference_in_election_process.pdf
[5] http://www.fefa.org.af/download/Campaign_Report%20For%20Website.pdf
[6] http://www.fefa.org.af/download/PressReleaseEN.pdf
[7] http://www.osce.org/item/html
[8] http://www.fefa.org.af/pressrelease
[9] http://www.afghanwomensnetwork.org/advocacy
[10] http://w
[11] http://www.afghanistan.unifem.org/docs/pubs/07/factsheet.html
[12] http://www.ifes.org/features
[13] http://www.fefa.org.af/eng_pages/reports/VRP_Rep/VRP_3.pdf
[14] http://www.walesonline.co.uk/.../brown-hails-success-of-panther-s-claw-in-
[15] http://www.online.wsj.com/article/SB124994313594220571.html
[16] http://www.osac.gov
[17] http://www.iec.org.af/results/leadingCandidate.html
[18] http://www.ecc.org.af/en/images/stories/pdf/ECC%20ORDER%202009-9-8%20en%20dr%20_%20Final.pdf
[19] http://www.pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=83084
[20] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/01/AR2009110100605.html
[21] http://www.iec.org.af/assets/pdf/pressrelease/pressrIECDecision20091102.pdf
[22] http://afghan2010.com/sites/default/files/DI Afghanistan 2009-Final Report (web).pdf
[23] http://afghan2010.com/taxonomy/term/122
[24] http://afghan2010.com/taxonomy/term/45
[25] http://afghan2010.com/resource-type/report
